Chapter 1: Torts by Donovan, Peter A.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law




Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Civil Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Donovan, Peter A. (1969) "Chapter 1: Torts," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1969, Article 4.




PETER A. DONOVAN 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§l.l. Products liability. Regretfully, the Supreme Judicial Court 
has again held fast to the privity of contract defense in products li-
ability warranty actions, indicating that Massachusetts will remain 
loyal, at least for the present and perhaps for a considerable period 
of time, to an archaic relic of the past, long deemed indefensible by 
an overwhelming weight of judicial and secondary authority authored 
by many eminent jurists and legal scholars.1 
Kenney v. Sears, Roebuck'" CO.2 involved a damage action brought 
by two tenants in common of a two-family dwelling house owned 
by them to recover for fire damage to the building and certain per-
sonalty caused when a refrigerator caught fire. The appliance had 
been purchased by one of the co-tenants, Mrs. Kenney, from the de-
fendant Sears, Roebuck 8c Company for use by her in her apartment. 
The other co-tenant, Mrs. Copanas, was Mrs. Kenney's mother and 
apparently lived in the other apartment in the house. An action of 
tort or contract was brought against Sears, the retailer, and the Whirl-
pool Corporation, the manufacturer of the refrigerator, on several 
theories, charging both with negligence and breach of warranty. Mrs. 
Kenney was a plaintiff on each of 12 counts. Her mother, Mrs. Co-
panas, was co-plaintiff on three counts, charging both defendants 
with breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. At 
trial, verdicts were directed for defendants on all counts except two 
by Mrs. Kenney charging Sears with breach of implied warranties. 
Judgment was entered on jury verdicts for Sears on these counts. Both 
plaintiffs appealed. 
PETER A. DoNOVAN is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§l.l. 1 See, e.g., Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966); Jaeger, How Strict Is the Manufacturer's 
IJability? Recent Developments, 48 Marq. L. Rev. 293 (1964-1965). 
:11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 567, 246 N.E.2d 649. 
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The Court easily disposed of the negligence counts on evidentiary 
grounds since the expert testimony in the record did not resolve the 
critical question of "whether the fire was caused within the refriger-
ator or by some external combustion."3. The case against Whirlpool 
was particularly weak. There was no showing that the refrigerator 
"was delivered to Sears in good order or that it had not been mishan-
dled by Sears, or by other handlers on its way from Whirlpool to 
Sears."4 Referring to its earlier decision in Carter v. Yardley 0- CO.,5 
which abolished the privity defense in negligence actions, the Court 
stated, "[t]he burden still remains upon the plaintiffs, in a case ... 
brought by persons not in privity with the manufacturer, to show 
that 'a defect attributable to the manufacturer's negligence caused 
the injury.'''6 It was also suggested in the opinion that Whirlpool 
might have had a defense to any negligence count since the refriger-
ator had been running with signs of defective operation for over a 
year without having been repaired, thus presenting the issue whether 
Whirlpool reasonably might have relied upon Sears, as retailer, to 
make necessary repairs under its own warranty.7 
While the Court's decision on the negligence counts is thus well 
founded on the law and firmly substantiated on the record, its deci-
sion on the warranty counts is most egregious. Without any analysis 
of the legal or economic issues involved, the Court dismissed a,ll im-
plied warranty counts against the manufacturer with a simple state-
ment: "So far as the counts against Whirlpool are framed on any 
basis other than negligence, they do not state any ground of liability 
recognized in Carter v. Yardley 0- Co . .. ,"8 Mrs. Copanas's warranty 
count against the retailer was treated with siD;lilar disdain and dis-
missed with the same irrationality and the simple observation that 
"Sears's liability is limited by [Uniform Commercial Code §2-318] to 
injuries to the person of those 'in the family or household of the puyer 
or of one 'who is a guest in his home.' "9 , 
The reaction of the Court and its upholding of the directed verdicts 
on the warranty counts is indefensible. The fatal blow to the privity-
of~contract defense to implied warranty actions was delivered by the 
decision of the Supreme Court of New J~rsey in Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc.,1o a case which must be recognized as one of the most, 
if not the most, influential decisions in the entire history of Anglo-
ald. at 569,246 N.E.2d at 652. 
4 Ibid. 
II 519 Mass. 92, 96-98, 64 N.E.2d'695, 695-697 (1946). 
e Kenney v. Sears, Roebuck Be Co., 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 570, 246 N.E.2d at 
652-655, quoting from Carney v. Bereault, 548 Mass. 502, 5()6, 204 N.E.2d 448-451 
(1965). 
7Id. at 570, 246 N.E.2d at 652. The Court here made reference to. its decision 
during the 1968 SUllVEY year in Haley v. Allied Chemical Corp., 353 Mass. 325, 
550,2!ll N.lt2d 549,555 (1967), noted in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.3, at 46.· 
SId. at 571, 246 N.E.2d at 655. 
II Ibid. 
1052 N.J. 558, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
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Saxon law. The effect of this decision was immediate and startling. As 
Dean Prosser has ably pointed out, "What has followed has been the 
most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule 
in the entire history of the law of torts."l1 Warranty actions permitting 
recovery of damages against remote vendors in the distributive chain 
of merchants through which goods move from manufacturers to 
ultimate consumers have now become a firmly entrenched and well 
recognized basis of tort liability throughout the United States. More-
over, liability on warranty theories has not been limited to purchasers 
of products or services. Warranty protection was extended by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the 
Uniform Commercial Code to "persons ... in the family or household 
[of the buyer or] a guest in his home."12 It was extended by the 
American Law Institute in the Restatement of Torts Second to the 
person or property of "the ultimate user or consumer";18 and, most 
importantly, the courts have extended it to the expanded class of 
foreseeable innocerit bystanders who may be injured by defective 
products in both sale and non-sale cases.14 In thus expanding the scope 
of warranty protection, the courts have maintained a position of 
neutrality as to the extent of possible claims proposed by the draftsmen 
of the code and the Restatement. In official comments to these codes, 
the authors state their intentions not to confine the class of protected 
beneficiaries to those enumerated in the text of the rules, but to permit 
the question to be determined by developing case law on the subject. lIS 
In their decisional warranty opinions, the courts have also recognized 
11 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. 
L. Rev. at 793-794. 
12 U.C.C. §2-318. 
18 2 Restatement of Torts Second §402A (1965). 
14 See, e_g., the following Connecticut decisions: Garthwaith v. Burgio, 15!! 
Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965) (patron of beauty parlor permitted recovery on 
decisional tort warranty action against manufacturer of hair coloring dye, despite 
lack of privity and absence of sale as opposed to rendition of services); Mitchell 
v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965) (allowing estate of 
golfer to recover damages for death caused when unattended automobile rolled 
out of parking lot down incline to fairway and hit him, despite lack of privity 
and the absence of sale); Simpson v. Powered Products of Michigan, Inc., 24 Conn. 
Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963) (upholding suit brought by golfer, injured 
while using defective golf cart rented from golf professional, against golf pro 
himself, distributor, and manufacturer, despite lack of privity and absence of 
sale). See also the discussion of these and other decisions in Donovan, Recent 
Developments in Products Liability Litigation in New England: The Emerging 
Confrontation Between the Expanding Law of Torts and the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 19 Maine L Rev. 181, 231-238 (1967). 
111 Official Cominent 3, §2-318 of the U.C.C., provides: "This section expressly 
includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household, and guests of 
the purchasee_ Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge 
or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his 
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain." 
Official -Comment 0 to 2 Restatment of Torts Second §402A provide,: "The In-
stitute expresses neither approval nor disapproval of expansion of the rule to 
permit recovery by [non-users and non-consumers]." 
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the fact that tort liability without fault and without privity for harm 
caused by defective products is the law of the future, if not the present. 
Since consumers everywhere are already paying for this protection, 
the courts have felt compelled to give them the benefits of its im-
mediate adoption. 
Quite clearly, the handwriting is on the wall. Strict liability is 
rapidly becoming the law of the land. The question thus forcefully 
arises: Why is it not the law of Massachusetts? Is there any justification 
for retention of the privity defense in products liability cases? The 
Supreme Judicial Court cannot continue to avoid this most pressing of 
all tort questions. In the 1968 SURVEY we thought it wise to recall the 
words of such significant laymen and lawyers as Aristode and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.16 In light of the Court's inexcusable decision, we 
find it not only wise but expedient and necessary to recall them here 
as well. 
. . . Even when laws have been written down, they ought not 
always to remain unaltered.17 
. 
. . . It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than 
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more 
revolting if the grO,unds upon which it was laid have vanished long 
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the 
past.1S 
§I.2. Deceit: Knowledge. In the 1969 SURVEY year, the Court 
re-examined areas of the law concerning deceit and overruled so~e 
early and outdated cases which had held that a false statement made 
without recklessness or knowledge of the truth will not support an 
action for deceit. In Powell v. Rasmussen,l the defendant had informed 
the plaintiff that certain stock was for sale and asked whether plaintiff 
was interested in the investment. Plaintiff responded affirmatively, 
stating that he would put up $5000 toward the purchase price if all 
other money necessary for the purchase was raised. Later, defendant 
told the plaintiff that a third party with sufficient funds planned to 
acquire the stock for $100,000 and "if the plaintiff wanted 'to get 
in on it,''' the third party was holding the last $5000 worth of stock 
for him.2 Plaintiff then purchased the stock, paying with two checks 
drawn to the order of the third party. Stock certificates were issued 
to him. Between the dates on which the two checks were drawn, the 
third party executed a contract to purchase all the stock for $100,000. 
The actual sale of the stock never took place, however, because the 
third party was unable to raise the purchase price. The stock held by 
plaintiff became worthless and plaintiff sued in tort for deceit. 
16 See 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.4, at 49. 
17 Aristotle, Politica (politics) ii.8. 1269&8·10. 
18 Holmes, The Path of the Law, reprinted in The Law of Literature 614, 626 
(London ed. 1966). 
§1.2. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 13, 243 N.E.2d 167. 
2Id. at 14, 243 N.E.2d at 168. 
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The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant upon plaintiff's 
failure to prove the defendant had known his statement to be false. On 
appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, stating: 
..• it has been held in a long line of cases8 that "the charge of 
fraudulent intent, in an action for deceit, may be maintained by 
proof of a statement made, as of the party's own knowledge, which 
is false, provided that the thing stated is not merely a matter of 
opinion, estimate, or judgment, but is susceptible of actual knowl-
edge; and in such case it is not necessary to make any further proof 
of an actual intent to deceive.'" 
This approach is supported by Section 526 of the Restatement of Torts 
Second, which provides: 
A misrepresentation in a business transaction is fraudulent if 
the maker 
(a) knows or believes the matter to be otherwise than as re-
presented, or 
(b) knows that he has not the confidence in its existence or 
nonexistence asserted by his statement or knowledge or belief, or 
(c) knows that he has not the basis for his knowledge or belief 
professed by his assertion. 
Under Subsection (c) and the Massachusetts rule, a statement is fraud-
ulent if a speaker represents he has personal knowledge of a fact when 
he does not, even though he is honestly concinced of its truth from 
hearsay or other sources,ll 
The action of the trial court in directing a verdict for the defendant 
finds some support in a few early Massachusetts decisions which re-
quired that the speaker either know of the untruth or be reckless as 
to the truth or falsity of the statement.s These cases were eJCpressly over-
ruled in Powell. Massachusetts law is now in accord with the observa-
tion of Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent to one of them: 
The representation was not made in casual talk, but in a 
business matter, for the very purpose of inducing others to lay 
out their money on the faith of it. When a man makes such a 
representation, he knows that others will understand his words 
according to their usual and proper meaning, and not by the 
accident of what he happens to have in his head, and it seems to 
me one of the first principles of social intercourse that he is bound 
at his peril to know what that meaning is.' 
a Id. at 15, 245 N.E.2d at 169.-Ed. 
'Id. at 14,24!J N.E.2d at 168. 
&I 5 R.estatement of Torti Second §526, Comment ,. 
SAlpine v. Friend Bros., Inc., 244 Mass. 164, 167, US, N.E. 555, 554 (1923); 
Thaxter v. Bugbee, 59 Mass. 221, 225 (1849); Tryon v. Whitmarsh, 42 Mass. 1, 7·S 
(1840). 
'I Nash v. Minnesota Title Ina. &: Trust Co., 165 M .... 574, 586, 40 N.E. 1059, 1042 
(1895). 
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§1.3. Deceit by agent: Unauthorized by principal. In Doody v~ 
John Sexton & CO.,l plaintiff was promised by two of defendanfs 
officers lifetime employment in defendant's Los Angeles office if he 
would move to California. Plaintiff accepted but found that he was 
"out of phase" with his California manager, who set forth terms of 
employment different from those which had been promised. When 
plaintiff asked defendant's officer if he had been "kidding" about the 
promise of employment, the officer replied affirmatively. Having ter-
minated his employment and having returned to Boston, plaintiff 
brought an action in federal court against the defendant for breach 
of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. Verdict for defendant 
was directed on the contract count on the ground that defendant's 
officers had neither real nor apparent authority to promise lifetime 
employment. On the misrepresentation count, verdict was returned 
for plaintiff. Defendant appealed and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, applying Massachusetts law, affirmed, 
holding that a promise made without intention to perform is action-
able and that a principal may be held liable in tort when such a 
promise is made by its agent, even though the agent was unauthorized 
to make the promise. 
Since it could not be held liable in contract for the unauthorized 
undertaking of its agent, the defendant argued it should not be held 
liable in tort: "[TJort liability would be illogical, and merely open the 
back door when the front door was closed."2 In rejecting this argument 
the court noted that a principal may be held accountable in tort for 
unauthorized acts of an agent "not too far removed from the scope 
of his authority, even though, strictly, they were not authorized."s The 
court, however, declined to rely on this general principle but rather 
held that Robichaud v. Athol Credit Union4 was "closely in point" 
and supportive of plaintiff's argument. 
In Robichaud, a representative of defendant lender "who had au-
thority to deal with such matters" told plaintiff borrower that his loan 
was covered by life insurance under defendant's group policy. How-
ever, the loan was for 15 years, and a Massachusetts statute did not 
permit insurance on loans in excess of 10 years. Defendant was held 
liable for misrepresentation "[e]ven if furnishing insurance would 
have been beyond the defendant's power."1i Therefore, argued the 
court in Doody, since the officers making the promise of employment 
were the president and vice-president of defendant corporation, they 
"clearly possessed certain hiring powers, [and] plaintiff had a right to 
rely on their representation even though their actual authority did 
not extend to the point they indicated,"6 that is, to a promise of life-
time employment. 
§l.S. 1411 F.2d 1119 (1st Cir. 1969). 
2 Id. at 1122. 
8 Ibid. 
4852 Mass. 851,225 N.E.2d 847 (1967). 
GId. at 855,225 N.E.2d at !ISO. 
8 Doody v. John Sexton Be Co., 411 F.2d at 1122. 
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In Robichaud the Supreme Judicial Court expressly ruled that the 
agentrnaking the misrepresentation had apparent authority to do so. 
Thus, the decision simply holds that where the agent making the 
statement is clothed with apparent authority, the principal may be 
liable for the misrepresentation of his agent even though the principal 
lacked the authority to effect the action promised by the agent. The 
decision is undoubtedly correct since the legal inability of the principal 
to effect the transaction promised does not constitute a defense to a 
deceit action predicated upon the principal's own misrepresentations. 
Since the Court in Doody ostensibly found the defendant's officers 
had apparent authority to promise lifetime employment, the Rob-
ichaud principle was properly found controlling. 
§1.4. Deceit: Damages. Two cases arose in the 1969 SURVEY year 
dealing with the measure of damages in an action of deceit. In Melvin 
v. H. J. Nassar Motor Co.,! the plaintiff bought a new automobile 
which he claimed was defective. The declaration contained three 
counts, the first for breach of warranty, the second for breach of war-
ranty stating a right to rescind, and the third in tort for deceit. De-
fendant's motions for directed verdicts on all counts were denied and 
the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff of $4000 on each count. On 
defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial judge ordered that unless 
the plaintiff remitted $1500 on each count the verdicts would be set 
aside and a new trial ordered. The plaintiff elected to take $2500 on 
the deceit count and waived the other two. On appeal by the defendant, 
the Supreme Judicial Court reversed, finding the evidence insufficient 
to establish the value of the defects, although proof of defect was clear. 
The Court did, however, conclude that the trial court properly charged 
the jury that the measure of damages in deceit actions was "the dif-
ference in value of property as it was and as it would have been if as 
represented."2 
In Goldman v. Mahoney,S plaintiffs, who had purchased a house 
later found to have a leaky basement, sued for damages both in tort, 
for false representation that the house was dry, and in contract, for 
breach of an undertaking given as part of the sale that defendants 
guaranteed the house for one year. The jury found for the defendants 
on both counts, and the plaintiffs appealed, alleging, among other 
things, impropriety in the jury instructions on the measure of damages. 
The trial court had properly ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
recover damages sufficient to give them the benefit of their contractual 
bargain if such damages were reasonably proved. Normally, as in 
Melvin, "benefit of the bargain" damages means the difference between 
the value of the property as represented and the value of the property 
as actually received by the plaintiff. Here, however, there was a com-
plication because the defendants had made improvements on the 
drainage system pursuant to their guaranty. Consequently, the judge 
stated at one point in his charge that damages should be measured by 
§1.4. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 655, 246 N.E.2d 679. 
2 Id. at 654, 246 N .E.2d at 680. 
31968 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1221,242 N.E.2d 405. 
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determining "the value of the property as it was represented to be, and 
then test that against the value of the house as it was, in fact, delivered 
after all these arrangements had been ultimately completed and these 
additional things were performed by the defendant.'" This correctly 
states the measure of damages in deceit actions. However, the jury 
instruction also contained the following statement: 
On the other hand, if you find that these plaintiffs gOt a tre-
-mendous buy from the beginning, that all of these misrepresenta-
tions, if there were any, were discounted in the price, that the 
house was worth every cent that they paid for it, and the mis-
representations didn't alter the value situation in any way, then 
if you come to that conclusion, the plaintiffs would be placed in 
the position of not having proved they were damaged.1i 
Plaintiffs took exception to this portion of the charge since it indicated 
no damages could be awarded if the property, as received and im-
proved, had a value equal to or greater than the purchase price, though 
less than the value of the property as represented. However, the 
Supreme Judicial Court noted that other portions of the charge ap-
pearing both before and after the challenged language were proper. 
The Court ultimately held, in light of the evidence as to value in the 
record, which evidence established the value of the property as rep-
resented to he equal to the purchase price, that there was no prej-
udical error. 
From this decision the question arises whether the Court impliedly 
disagreed with the challenged portion of the charge. It seems clear that 
it did: first, because the Court expressly held the other portions of 
the charge were correct; second, because it considered the question of 
prejudice on the clIallenged portions; and third, because it concluded 
on the evidence in the record of this case that there was in fact no 
prejudice to the plaintiffs resulting from the charge. Since the Court 
looked at the charge as a whole and expressly ruled portions of it were 
correct, it is difficult to argue that its ruling of no prejudice on the 
balance was an attempt to avoid a negative ruling on the law. 
§1.5. Vicarious liability. In Suckney v. Williams,1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that an employer may be liable for injuries to a 
bystander inflicted by an employee in connection with a labor dispute. 
The dispute in question in the case involved a disagreement between 
two unions over the delivery of alcoholic beverages. Plaintiff, an in-
nocent bystander, was walking by one of defendant trucking company's 
vehicles located outside a luncheonette when he was handed a leaflet 
by one of a number of pickets standing near the truck. The pickets 
4Id at 1224, 242 N.E.2d at 409. The Court cites and quotes the Restatement of 
Torts Second §547 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) and cites the case of Rice v. Price 
lI40 Mass. 502, 507·510, 164 N.E.2d 894·895 (1960). 
Ii Goldman v. Mahoney, 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1225 n.5. 242 N.E.2d at 409 n.5. 
§1.5. 1 1968 Mass. Adv. Sh. Il141, 242 N.E.2d 416. 
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were protesting the delivery by defendant of beer to the luncheonette. 
Kearns, an employee of defendant, was making the delivery, and, 
upon seeing plaintiff reading the leaflet, beat him with a long iron pipe. 
Plaintiff brought an action in tort for assault and battery against the 
employer, alleging that, at the time of the assault, Kearns was acting 
within the scope of his employment. Following a denial of defendant's 
motion for directed verdict the jury found for the plaintiff. The 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. holding the jury could have found 
that the defendant's undertaking with its truck drivers was to make 
sure that the deliveries of beer got through to the customers despite 
labor difficulties. They could have found that the accomplishment of 
this purpose not uncommonly contemplates a demonstration of force 
or threats of force or actual use of force. and that Kearns. as driver's 
helper. was hired to provide that element of service of the contract. 
Such findings. reasoned that Court. would bring the case within the 
rule which states that 
[a] master who authorizes a servant to perform acts which 
involve the use of force against persons or things. or which are 
of such a nature that they are not uncommonly accompanied by 
the use of force. is subject to liability for a trespass to such persons 
or things caused by the servant's unprivileged use of force exerted 
for the purpose of accomplishing a result within the scope of 
employment.2 
This rule is not inapplicable. the Court held. "because the means 
used may be other than that intended by the contract of employ-
ment."S 
The details of the labor dispute were not outlined in the Court's 
opinion. but the Court did indicate that Kearns was considered a 
"scab" by the picketing union. In view of this fact. it is possible that 
in assaulting the plaintiff Kearns might well have been motivated by 
personal reasons to retain for his union the business in dispute rather 
than a desire to insure the delivery of his employer's products. On this 
point, Comment d to Section 245 of the Restatement provides that the 
defendant employer should be relieved of liability where the servant 
has "no intent to act on his master's behalf." Comment d adds further 
that the employer's. liability is not precluded merely because the 
"servant acts in part because of a personal motive." Defendant's argu-
ment that the assault by Kearns must be regarded as an act of "per-
sonal ill will" was rejected by the Court on the ground that the jury 
could reasonably have found that Kearns assaulted plaintiff for the 
purpose of demonstrating the degree of force he would use "in order 
to insure" the delivery of his employer's product.4 
:.I Id. at 18411, 242 N.E.2d at 417. The rule, established in 1 Restatement of 
Agency §245, was cited and applied by the Court in Cowan v. Eastern Racing 
Assn. Inc., 880 Mass. 185, 145, HI N.E.2d 725, 758. 
81968 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 11148, 242 N.E.2d at 417. 
4 Ibid. 
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It appears from this decision and the Restatement that in future 
cases of this type a jury verdict will not be overturned where the 
evidence can reasonably support a finding that an employee was at 
least in part "acting on his master's behalf." Consequently, defense 
counsel will be well advised to seek a special verdict on the question 
of an employee's motivation. 
In another case, Konick v. Berke, Moore Co.,f'> the Supreme Judicial 
Court indicated that it would "no longer follow" a long line of cases 
holding that "a master-servant relationship does not exist unless the 
employer has a right to control the manner and means (the· details, 
in other words) of operating the car" driven by an employee. Under 
these older cases many employers were able to escape liability for the 
torts of their employees committed while on the employer'S business.s 
In Konick, the Court reversed judgments entered in favor of an 
employer notwithstanding verdicts for two plaintiffs injured by the 
negligence of an employee. The injuries occurred while the employee, 
normally a timekeeper, was driving his own automobile for the 
purpose of picking up the company's payroll at the direction of his 
supervisor. The . Court stated that where the negligent employee clearly 
was a servant in relation to his duties as a timekeeper, where he was 
instructed to do a specific job, and where he had at least implicit per-
mission to use his own car, the fact that he chose the route and speed 
does not change his status to that of an independent contractor.7 
§1.6. Damages: Attorney fees. During the 1969 SURVEY year the 
Supreme Judicial Court attempted to clarify the situations which per-
mit recovery of counsel fees by parties to actions of tort.1 In M. F. 
Roach Co. v. Town of Provincetown,2 the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion of contract and quantum meruit against the town to recover 
the costs of work performed under a unit price contract for' construc-
tion of an airport. He joined the defendant in the suit in order· to 
recover damages for intentional interference with his contractual 
rights under the construction contract with the town. Finding that 
the defendant had. tortiously interfered with the plaintiff's contract, 
the trial court assessed damages for lost profits on uncompleted con-
tract items and also awarded $7500 to cover plaintiff's counsel fees in 
prosecuting the claim against the town. On appeal the Court held 
that although counsel fees are generally not collectible as an element 
of damage, "the rule has its exception in the event of tortious conduct 
111969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 405,245 N.E.2d 750. See §1.18 infra for extensive discussion. 
SId. at 409, 245 N.E.2d at 751. 
7 Ibid. 
§1.6. 1 Counsel fees are recoverable in other areas such as in divorce proceed-
ings. Hayden v. Hayden, S26 Mass. 587,96 N.E.2d IS6 (1950). See also G.L., c. 208, 
§S8, and cases thereunder. Statutes have also awarded counsel fees in specific 
situations. G.L., c. 9SA, §9. The partner to a contract may also contract to cover 
attorney's fees. 
21969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 707, 247N.E.2d S77. 
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similar to that in this case requiring the victim of the tort to sue or 
defend against a third party in order to protect his rights."3 
In these isolated instances, the plaintiff usually sues the tortfeasor 
to recover counsel fees in a second action. Here, however, both claims 
were joined in one lawsuit, but the Court, nevertheless, held that the 
plaintiff could recover counsel fees, basing its decision in the matter on 
a California case involving a similar issue. In Prentice v. North Amer-
ican Title Guaranty Corp.;' the plaintiffs, sellers of a plot of land, 
had agreed to subordinate a mortgage they held on the land in order 
~o enable the purchasers to borrow money for the sole purpose of 
constructing all apartment building on the premises. The purchasers 
subsequently obtained a loan and gave a note secured by what had 
become the first mortgage. The defendant acted as escrow holder and 
closed the transaction'pursuant to written instructions from the parties. 
The borrowed funds were not used for the apartment building, and 
the purchasers later filed for bankruptcy. Plantiff brought an action 
against the purchasers, the creditor whose loan was secured by the 
land, and the defendant escrow agent. The trial court granted plaintiff 
a decree quieting title to the land, found that the defendant was 
negligent in closing· the sale, and assessed damages to cover counsel 
fees incurred by plaintiff in the action to quiet title. On appeal the 
California Supreme Court affirmed, holding the plaintiff could recover 
attorney fees even though the actions were consolidated.1I 
The Court in Roach cited only one Massachusetts case on the issue 
of counsel fees for the proposition that they are not ordinarily col-
lectible.6 Although the California case supports the general exception 
to that rule, it was used as authority only to support the holding that 
consolidation of actions does not prevent recovery of counsel fees. 
The Court's silence as to other Massachusetts cases is surprising since 
there is adequate Massachusetts authority to support the decision. An 
early Massachusetts case, Wheeler v. Hanson,7 awarded counsel fees 
in a malicious prosecution action to cover costs expended in the 
defense of the earlier criminal action. Wheeler has become the basis 
of several other cases permitting recovery of counsel fees.s Representa-
tive of these cases is Malloy v. CarrollJ 9 where plaintiffs, who had been 
expelled from a union, obtained an order directing their reinstatement. 
In a subsequent action they sought and recovered damages including 
an award for counsel fees expended in the first action.10 Noting 
3Id. at 70S. 247 N.E.2d at 1I7S. 
459 Cal. 2d 61S. 1I0 Cal. Rptr. S21. lIS1 P.2d 645 (I 9611). 
II Id. at 620. 1I0 Cal. Rptr. at S211. lIS1 P.2d at 647 . 
. 6 Chartrand v. Riley. 354 Mass. 242. 2117 N.E.2d 10 (1968). 
'1 161 Mass. 1I70. 1I7 N.E. lIS2 (IS94). 
8 Malloy v. Carroll. 287 Mass. 1I76. 191 N.E. 661 (19114); Ashton v. Walstenholme. 
2411 Mass. 1911. 11I7 N.E. 1I76 (1922); Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell. 21111 Mass. 
174. 1211 N.E. 615 (1919). 
9272Mass. 524. 172 N.E. 790 (1911O). 
lOMalloy v. Carroll.2S7 Mass. 1I76. 191 N.E. 661 (19M). 
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that taxable costs generally are considered full compensation to the 
prevailing party, the Supreme Judicial Court willingly admitted that 
such costs are sometimes wholly inadequate: 
In actions based on wrongful conduct of the defendant, where 
the wrong is of such a character that the proper protection of the 
plaintiff's rights necessarily requires him to employ counsel to 
gain redress for the wrong, he may recover as an element of 
damage reasonable counsel fees. [Citing Wheeler.]l1 
Subsequent cases have sought to limit this test. Goldberg v. Curhan12 
held that counsel fees incurred by the plaintiff due to the wrongful 
conduct of the defendant are not recoverable in the very action 
brought by the plaintiff to redress his wrong. IS Malloy, the Court 
stated, was to be regarded as "exceptional." Final disapproval of 
Malloy was expresed by the Court in Chartrand v. Riley,14 where it 
overruled three earlier decisions applying the Malloy test.11i In an 
earlier action, the. plaintiff, Chartrand, had successfully prosecuted 
mandamus proceedings to compel the registrar of motor vehicles to 
reinstate him as an employee.18 In the Riley action, he sought to 
recover the counsel lees previously expended. On appeal, the Court 
disallowed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, stating that "[t]axable 
costs are deemed full compensation to the prevailing party for the 
expense of conducting litigation, even though in fact such costs do 
not cover his legal or other expense."17 Recog¢zing the necessity for 
a different rule in malicious prosecution cases such as Wheeler, the 
Court found the Malloy rule much too broad for retention. Except 
for the area of malicious prosecution, the opinion does not detail 
the occasions when a plaintiff can collect counsel fees.18 After 
Chartrand, the law in Massachusetts was left in confusion. 
Roach may be construed as an attempt to clarify the law. The test 
it used is similar to that of Section 914 of Restatement of Torts 
Second, which provides: 
A person who through the tort of another has been required 
to act in the prosecution of his interests by bringing or defending 
an action against a third party is entitled to recover compensa-
11 Id. at S85, 191 N.E. at 665. 
12SS2 Mass. SIO, 124 N.E.2d 926 (1955). 
18Id. at S12, 124 N.E.2d at 927. 
14S54 Mass. 242, 2117 N.E.2d 10. 
11i See note 8 supra. 
18 Chartrand v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 547 Mass. 470, 198 N.E.2d 425 
(1964). 
17 Chartrand v. Riley, S54 Mass. at 24S·244, 257 N.E.2d at 11. This is, of course, 
a fiction. The costs do not come near to covering the expenses. 
18 Other cases wherein attorney's fees are collectible still stand. See Spilene v. 
Corey, S2S Mass. 67S, 84 N.E.2d 5 (1949); Potter Press v. C. W. Potter, Inc., 50S 
Mass. 485, 22 N.E.2d 68 (19S9); Boston &: Albany R.1l. v. Richardson, 155 Mass. 
47S (188S). 
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tion . for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney fees and 
other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred.19 
15 
This section was referred to in the California case which the 
Court so approvingly cited.2O Under this rule counsel fees may be 
recovered only where they are expended in actions brought by or 
against third parties. Moreover, as Goldberg v. Curhan holds, the 
plaintiff may not recover counsel fees expended in the very action 
brought to redress his wrong. This is true even if there is a joinder 
or consolidation of actions since the Roach Court remanded the case 
to determine the amount of counsel fees incurred solely in prosecuting 
the claim against the third party. 
§1.7. Negligence: Causation: Public carriers. The judicial bar-
riers to tort recovery against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority for negligent operation of a street car have been outlined 
in Berger v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.1 Plaintiff 
there alleged that she boarded a car and rested her hand on the coin 
box. The car "started off with a jerk" and "she was jerked all around 
the place; she grabbed onto an upright post with her right hand 
and bumped her head against the post; before she knew it the car 
came to a stop with a jerk, causing her to be thrown in a different 
direction 'back and forth' but she did not lose her grip on the 
post:'2 
Following the denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict, 
the jury found for plaintiff. The Supreme Judicial Court sustained 
defendant's exception to the denial of its motion. The Court inter-
preted plaintiff's allegations as setting forth two separate claims: 
negligence in starting, and negligence in stopping. In reference to 
the first claim, the Court noted that a plaintiff must show negligence 
either by direct evidence of what the operator did or by evidence 
that the jerk was "unusual or beyond common experience," that is, 
that it was "of extraordinary force."s The Court then noted that 
plaintiff had not introduced any direct evidence of what the operator 
had done, and found as a matter of law that the jolt, as plaintiff 
had described it, was not unusual or extraordinary. To illustrate the 
requirement of a showing of extraordinary force, the Court cited 
Nolan v. Newton Street Ry.,. where the successful plaintiff testified 
that the car had started up with such a velocity that it had appeared 
the car was "going to stand right up." Even if plaintiff had been 
more imaginative in her testimony, her claim of negligence in starting 
would have been barred by the firm grip defense, which, in the 
194 Restatement of Torts Second §914. 
20See also 15 Am. Jur. Damages §144, at 552 (1958); 25 C.j.S. Damages §50, at 
554 (1941). 
§1.7. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sb. 657,246 N.E.2d 665. 
2Id. at 657, 246 N.E.2d at 666. 
11 Id. at 658, 246 N .E.2d at 666 . 
• 206 Mass. 584, 92 N.E. 505 (1910). 
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language of the Court, means that "verdicts are properly ordered 
for the defendant carrier where the grip of the passenger is not firm 
and is broken by a jerk."11 In the instan~ case, of course, the plaintiff 
did not show that at the starting of the' car she had had a firm grip 
on anything, and recovery was therefore denied. 
Although the firm grip defense is easily r~butted, such is not the 
case with the barrier to plaintifFs claim of negligence in the stopping 
of the car. In order to go to the jury on a claim of negligent stopping 
of a street car, plaintiff has the burden of showing that "the stop was 
not caused by an impending. collision or some condition of traffic re-
quiring it."& (Emphasis adcIed..) Plaintiff in Berger failed to introduce 
any evidence of observation of "possible obstacles in the path of the 
car," probably because at the time 'of the stopping she was being 
thrown about. In a negligence action, the placing of a burden of 
proof of a "negative fact" upon a party who is very unlikely to have 
knowledge of that fact 'indicates a judicial policy disfavoring recovery 
by that party. The Court's deciSion in Berger, it would seem, is indic-
ative of a policy against allowing recovery for negligence from a 
public carrier. 
§1.8. Negligence: Foreseeability. The foreseeability of irrational 
behavior was recently examined by the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester~ Inc.,l and by a federal court ap-
plying Massachusetts law in Bannon v. l1,nited States.2 Plaintiff in 
Carey, a patron in defendant's tavern, was shot by another of defen-
dant's customers. The assailant, a known . "troublemaker" in de-
fendant's bar, was "Ilbsolutely drunk" at the time of the shooting 
and had been boisterously staggering about the premises prior to 
the shooting.s Plaintiff brought an action in tort against the operator 
of the tavern, arguing that it had been negligent in fulfilling its 
duty to prevent injury by third parties to paYing patrons. Judgment 
was entered for plaintiff upon a jury verdi~t, and defendant's excep-
tion to the denial 'of its JI!.otion for directed verdict was overruled by 
the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court held that the jury could 
have found the defendant to' have been negligent in not stopping the 
assailant's drunken staggenngs or failing in some other way to provide 
for the patrons' safety. 
In response to defendant's argument that the shooting was not 
foreseeable, the Court said the defendant's agents should have realized 
that ,the assailant's activities' constituted a danger to others, and 
further, that it was k'easonably' foreseeable that a shooting would 
occur. In this regard, the Court stated that serving hard liquor to 
one already drunk "has a consequence which is not open to successful 
II 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 658, 246 N.E.2d at 667. 
& Id. at 659, 246 N.E.2d at 667. 
§1.8. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 891, 245 N.E.2d 420. 
2298 F. SUpp. 1050 (D.R.I. 1968). 
SI969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 892, 245 N.E.2d at 422. 
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dispute [and] may well make the individual unreasonably aggressive, 
and enhance a condition in which it is foreseeable that almost any 
irrational act is foreseeable."4 Although this strong language suggests 
that a Massachusetts tavern owner is, in effect, an insurer of the safety 
of all customers who may be injured as a result of irrational behavior 
of drunken patrons, such language must be read in light of the Court's 
treatment of Addison v. Green Cafe, Inc.& 
In Addison, the plaintiff, a customer in the defendant's tavern, was 
shot by another patron. An argument had erupted among several 
customers, and while the defendant's employees were trying to quiet 
the men and summon a police officer employed by the defendant, 
another customer, who was uninvolved in the altercation and who 
was seated some distance away, began shooting wildly. This customer 
fired four or five shots, one of which wounded the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff sued the tavern owner in tort, claiming that her personal 
injuries were suffered as a result of the defendant's negligence. The 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the judge, on leave re-
served, entered judgment for the defendant. The Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff's injuries were not 
caused by any action of the defendant. The shooting was independent 
of any negligence of the defendant and was not the consequence of 
any act for which the defendant was responsible. The customer who 
fired the shots was, therefore, an intervening cause, and as such, 
broke any causal connection which may have existed beforehand 
between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's injury. The opinion 
made no mention of the state of sobriety of the assailant, and it 
was not indicated whether drunkenness could have caused his actions. 
The Carey Court distinguishes Addison on the sole ground that 
the assailant in that case was not a party to the scufHe. Addison could 
also have been distinguished on the ground that the defendant tavern 
keeper in that case was not negligent since he had employed a police 
officer and his employees had attempted to settle the disturbance. 
The Carey defendant took no action despite earlier disturbances. A 
distinction could also have been drawn on the ground that there was 
no showing in Addison that the assailant, although drunk, had been 
served by the defendant at any time; it was shown in Carey that the 
assailant had been served. Instead of drawing these factual distinc-
tions, the court distinguished the two cases on the basis of the 
Restatement of Torts Second, which states that even though a third 
party's negligent act may not prevent the defendant's conduct from 
being a legal cause, "the negligence of the act may be so great or 
the third person's conduct so reckless as to make it appear an extra-
ordinary response to the situation created by the actor and therefore 
a super~eding cause of the other's harm."6 
4 Id. at 898, 245 N.E.2d at 422. 
& 82!1 Mass. 620, 84 N.E.2d 88 (1949). 
82 Restatement of Torts Second §447, Comment g. 
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A problem arises since the Carey Court fails to distinguish Addison 
on the ground ,that it was not shown whether the assailant was 
served when drunk. If the assailant were so served, the Carey lan-
guage makes any irrational act foreseeable and thus not extraordinary. 
The court in Carey should either have distinguished Addison on the 
factual grounds referred to above or else clearly have held that in 
any cases where the defendant serves a drunken customer, the cus-
tomer's actions can never be a superseding cause. ''Since Addison was 
distinguished only on the basis that the assailant in Addison was not a 
participant in the scu1He, it is unclear how the court will resolve a 
case with a fact pattern similar to Addison, but in which appears an 
additional showing that the defendant had served an already drunken 
assailant. 
The plaintiff in Bannon brought an action under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act as administratrix of Russell Bannon, alleging that the 
negligence of defendant's Veteran's Hospital had caused Bannon's 
self-innicted death. The decedent had been a patient at the Veteran's 
Hospital in Brockton, Massachusetts, and was being treated by the 
hospital for mental illness at the time of his death. He had full 
freedom of movement at the hospital, and was required only to 
report each morning for therapy class and to be present each night 
for a bed check at 9:80 P.M. On the day in question the decedent 
was discovered missing at the time of the bed check and the police 
were notified. Sometime in the afternoon of that same day he had 
left the hospital and entered a gun shop in Providence, Rhode Island. 
While the clerk was in the rear of the shop, the decedent shot himself 
in the head. 
Plaintiff alleged liability under the Massachusetts death statute,7 
on the ground that the hospital had been negligent in its care, 
supervision and management of the decedent, and that such negligence 
had been the proximate cause of the suicide. Plaintiff introduced 
expert testimony that the patient had not been under proper hospital 
supervision and that there had been improper delays in discovering 
his elopement and in mounting attempts to locate him. Plaintiff also 
introduced additional evidence of repeated suicidal threats, assaultive 
behavior, drinking episodes while on other elopements from the 
hospital, the purchase of guns and the carrying of knives by deceased. 
The Court found as a matter of fact that the care given to the decedent 
had been commensurate with the care given by other hospitals, that 
the medical records pertaining to the decedent had been adequately 
kept, that the rules governing the decedent's freedom of movement 
had been warranted, and that it could not have been anticipated as 
likely that the decedent would commit suicide. 
Plaintiff argued that neither "anticipation" nor "comparable care" 
is a part of Massachusetts law. Under plaintifFs theory, the question 
was simply "whether the hospital was negligent in its care, supervision 
7 G.L., c. 229, §2. 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 4
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/4
§1.8 TORTS 19 
and management of the patient and whether such negligence was the 
proximate cause of the injuries sustained."s Defendant, on the other 
hand, contended that a hospital's duty to exercise reasonable care for 
its patients is limited "by the rule that no one is required to guard 
against or take measures to avert that which a reasonably prudent 
person under the circumstances would not anticipate as likely to 
happen."" In rejecting plaintiff's argument the court held that "the 
Massach~setts Supreme Court, if confronted with the question as to 
the measure of care a hospital must exercise in caring for mentally 
ill persons relative to suicide, would employ the foreseeability limita-
tion .... "10 In finding that the suicide was not foreseeable, the court 
stated that on the basis of all the evidence, it could be inferred that 
it was foreseeable that deceased might elope, get drunk, or act ir-
rationally and with excitability. There was, however, no legally 
sufficient evidence that the deceased had ever attempted to commit 
suicide or that his previous behavior indicated that the hospital 
should have anticipated suicide. The evidence that deceased had 
threatened suicide was deemed insufficient to sustain a finding that 
suicide was foreseeable since it is "quite universal" for patients to 
threaten suicide. It would seem that the finding of the court is, in 
effect, a holding that the specific act of suicide must be foreseen rather 
than irrational or destructive behavior in general and that, as a matter 
of law, suicide is not foreseeable unless there has been a previous 
suicidal attempt. 
The projections by the Bannon court as to how the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court would hold on this issue seem particularly narrow 
in light of the Court's statement in Carey that the mere serving of 
liquor to an inebriate may "enhance a condition in which it is fore-
seeable that almost any irrational act is foreseeable." The Carey de-
cision in effect broadened the concept of foreseeability since only 
the likelihood of irrational behavior and not the specific action by 
the patron need be foreseen. The Bannon court applied a narrower 
theory and held that the specific act of suicide rather than irrational 
behavior must be foreseeable. Bannon was, of course, concerned with 
suicide, a contingency which is, by its nature, perhaps less foreseeable 
than injury to a third party.11 If in Carey the drunken patron had 
committed suicide, the Court might have held that the suicide could 
not have been foreseen.12 If the Court would not have so held, the 
Bannon court is in the strange position of imposing on mental hos-
S Bannon v. United States, 295 F. Supp. at 1054. 
" Ibid. 
10 Id. at 1055. 
11 This may be questionable in the Bannon fart pattern since the Court men-
tions that suicide threats are common among mental patients. 
12 In a suicide case, the patron's estate would have difficulty recovering because 
of the probability of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. This 
issue would be more likely to arise when comparative negligence becomes effective. 
See Chapter 2 infra. 
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pitals a duty toward their patients that is less stringent than that 
imposed on tavern owners toward their customers. 
, §1.9. Negligence: Foreseeability; Assumption of the risk. In a 
more humorous vein, the Supreme Judicial Court has issued a stem 
warning to those who would choose to enter upon a crowded dance 
floor that they do 80 at their own risk. Henceforth, the courts of the 
Commonwealth will be closed to those who are injured as a result 
of being "bumped" by others while dancing in an overcrowded hall. 
Such is the effect of the court's decision in Goggin v. New State 
Ba.llroom.1 While waltzing to cha cha or jitterbug music, plaintiff, 
who had paid a fee to enter defendant dance hall, was knocked to 
the floor by another of defendant's. customers. Plaintiff brought an 
action in tort claiming the status of an invitee injured by reason of 
defendant's negligent failure to operate an orderly dance hall. Verdict 
was for plaintiff, following a denial of defendant's motion ~or a 
directed verdict. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that 
where dangerous conditions are "opeqand obvious" a dance hall 
operator is under no duty to warn his customers even when a sub-
stantial crowd ha4 gathered. Since dance hall proprietors are not 
insurers of the safety' of their patrons, their liability, if any, must 
arise from their knowledge - o~ the fact that in the exercise of 
reasonable care. they should have known or anticipated - that dis-
orderly actions of third parqes mightllead to injury to other patrons. 
In this regard, the Court stated that although "the bump which 
floored the plaintiff may have been deliberate [it] was, in our view, 
not, such a happening that the defendant was bound to anticipate 
it,"2 
The first ground ,of decision mentioned by the Court seems to be 
an application of the doctrine of assumption of the risk, while the 
second is apparently a holding that because the manner in which 
the plaintiff was injured was not foreseeable, defendant is not liable. 
The plaintiff see~s to be caught in fl paradox. On the one hand, the 
defendant had n~ duty to warn the plaintiff since the dangerous 
conditions existing in the dance hall,were "open and obvious," while 
on the other hand, the bump which "flpored" . plaintiff was so unusual 
that defendant was not bound to anticipate it. The impact of this 
decision on the dan~ is not presently clear. Though the Court stated 
that the "vagariesqf fashions in the dance and their consequences 
are better left subject to the judgment of those who engage in them 
.•• ,"8 it is arguable that the denial of recovery in Goggin may have a 
chilling effect on the more active, forms of dance now prevalent. 
§l.lO. Negligence: Violation of statute or ordinance. In Stimp-
son v. Wellington Service Corp.,1 the Supreme Judicial Court held 
§1.9. 11969 Mass. A~v. Sh. 683, 247 N.E.2d 350. 
2Id. at 685, 247 N.E.2d at 852. 
8 Ibid. 
§1.10. 1 1969 Mus. Adv. Sh. 645, 246 N.E.2d SOl. 
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that violation of a statute requiring vehicles weighing in excess of 
14 tons to obtain a pennit prior to operation of the vehicle over 
public ways may be found the proximate cause of the breaking of 
a subsurface water pipe. 
Plaintiff owned and occupied a building at Albany Street in Cam-
bridge. Sometime after 4:30 P.M. on July 10, 1962, a break occurred in 
a cast iron water pipe located just inside the basement wall of 
plaintiff's building. Plaintiff brought an action in tort against defen-
dant, alleging that the break had been caused by the operation by 
defendant on Albany Street on the morning of July 10, 1962, of a 
tractor trailer rig carrying a load of 85 tons. The basement pipe was 
connected to the city water main by a pipe which was located under 
Albany Street. Plaintiff sought unsuccessfuUy to introduce testimony 
of an expert engineer, which testimony would have tended to show 
that compression of the subsoil of the street would bend downward 
the connecting pipe, thereby causing severe strain to be put on the 
basement pipe. The evidence did show that on the morning of July 
10th defendant had been maneuvering the tractor trailer rig with its 
excess load on Albany Street and that, at one point, the trailer had 
fallen to the ground. It was also shown that defendant, in contraven-
tion of G.L., c. 85, §30, had failed to obtain a pennit from Cambridge 
to operate the overweight vehicle on the city's streets. 
Verdict was for plaintiff. The judge reserved leave to enter a verdict 
for defendant and reported to the Supreme Judicial Court for decision 
the question of whether the violation of the statute was a proximate 
cause of the break. The question was answered affinnatively, although 
the primary purpose of the statute was to protect the roadways them-
selves from injury due to overloaded vehicles. The Court reasoned, 
"the Cambridge authorities in considering an application for a pennit 
under the statute should have weighed" other possible effects of 
granting a pennit.2 Because defendant failed to apply for a pennit, the 
Cambridge authorities were not given an opportunity to appraise the 
risks and either to refuse the pennit altogether or impose conditions 
upon its exercise. Defendant knew that the delivery would require 
maneuvering great weights on Albany Street, and further, that this 
might affect underground installations. Failure to apply for a permit 
"was a failure to exercise due care as to those who might be injured if 
the load was in fact so heavy as to cause a break and resulting 
damage."3 
The Court's decision rests upon its belief that the Cambridge au-
thorities might have denied defendant's application for a pennit, 
thereby preventing the break, or have imposed conditions which would 
have protected persons against such damage as plaintiff suffered. To 
support its decision, the Court cited the prohibition of an existing 
Cambridge ordinance against moving over Cambridge streets vehicles 
2 Id. at 648, 246 N .E.2d at 805. 
8Id. at 649, 246 N.E.2d at 805. 
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SO loaded as to be likely to injure property.' In apparent further 
support for its conclusion that the failure to apply for a.permit was in 
itseH negligence, the Court reported that the state, in issuing a permit 
to defendant to use state highways, had required that all structures 
below and above ground shall be protected from injury, and that 
defendant "shall be responsible for all damages to persons or property 
due to or resulting from any work done" under the permit.1I 
Although the Cambridge authorities "should" perhaps have con-
sidered the possibility of subsurface damage, the ordinance cited by 
the Court gives no indication that such consideration was necessary 
or even likely to have been given. The ordinance speaks only of 
damage to "property." Moreover, the Court did not base its finding of 
negligence on the Cambridge ordinance but rather on the statute 
which provides that persons who operate a vehicle in violation of the 
statute "shall be liable in tort to the body politic or corporate having 
charge of the way for injury to the way thereby caused."6 There can be 
no doubt, as the Court indicated, that the statute was designed to 
protect the roadways themselves from injury; it expressly creates tort 
liability for soil injury. However, any recovery based on the statute for 
injuries to property other than roadways must be by implication. In 
deciding whether the violation of a statute gives rise to liability by 
implication, it is fundamental that liability should be implied only 
for invasion of those interests which the statute is designed to protect. 
The Court in Stimpson made no attempt to argue that in enacting the 
statute the legislature intended to protect property other than road-
ways. The Court asserted only that the Cambridge authorities "should 
have" considered the possibility of injury to property other than 
roadways. The opinion and its rationale are thus confusing. 
§l.ll. Negligence: Landlord and tenant. In Dolan v. Suffolk 
Franklin Savings Bank,l the Supreme Judicial Court, reluctant to 
overrule an earlier line of cases, attempted to distinguish them from 
the case at hand. The result thus reached is, particularly interesting 
since it now appears that the landlord owes a stricter duty of care to 
maintain in reasonably safe condition areas other than the common 
areas of a building. 
It is still the general rule in Massachusetts that a landlord owes only 
the duty to keep common areas of the building in as good a condition 
as they were, or appeared to be, at the time the tenancy began. In areas 
other than common areas, the landlord now owes a duty to keep the 
premises in a reasonably safe condition. Furthermore, violation of a 
safety ordinance is evidence of negligence ,in all areas controlled by 
the landlord except the common areas. 
'Id. at 648. 246N.E.2d at 804. 
II Id. at 648-649 n.2. 246 N .E.2d at 805 n.2. 
6 G.L •• c. 85. §!lO. . 
§1.Il. 11969 MIUI. Adv. Sh. 62!1. 246 N.E.2d 798. For further discussion of the 
Dolan cue see Chapter 5 intra. 
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In Dolan, plaintiff suffered personal injuries and property damage 
in a fire and explosion which occurred in a first floor restaurant located 
in defendant bank's apartment house. Plaintiff brought an action 
against the bank alleging violation of Section I008(a) of the Building 
Code of the City of Boston in that there were no sprinklers in defen-
dant's building and that the occupation of the premises by a restaurant 
using gas cooking facilities had been forbidden by the Appeal Board 
of the City of Boston. The appeal board had granted a prior owner's 
request that the building be exempted from Section I008(a) on the 
condition that the use of the fint floor as a restaurant be terminated. 
The lower court excluded plaintifFs offer of evidence of the Section 
lOO8(a) violation and granted defendant bank's motion for a directed 
verdict. In support of the lower court's evidenciary ruling, the bank 
cited a line of cases ending with Stapleton v. Cohen,2 which held that 
violation of a safety provision by a landlord is neither a ground of 
civil liability nor evidence of negligence. Rather than overruling this 
line of cases the Court limited its holdings "to situations where com-
mon areas are involved."3 
The Court made no attempt to set forth a rationale for its distinc-
tion. Indeed it is doubtful that a convincing rationale could be pro-
pounded. The Court did purport to find a basis for its holding in 
prior case law. The Court cited Wynn v. Sullivan,. where it was stated 
that a violation of a statute would have been evidence of negligence 
if defendant had owed a duty of care to the plaintiff in the case, who 
was a bare licensee. The Court quoted language in Wainwright v. 
JacksonlS which, by implication, indicates that a landlord has a 
duty to use due care in maintaining an apartment building in a 
reasonably safe condition. Therefore, argued the Court. since there is 
a duty to use care, violation of a safety statute is admissible as evidence 
of negligence. Though the Court strained to construct a precedential 
basis for limiting its decision to non-common areas, it is doubtful that 
the Stapleton line of cases will survive the onslaught of future litiga-
tion. 
§1.12. Malicious prosecution. Some interesting malicious prosecu-
tion issues were presented in Jacova v. Widett.1 The defendant had 
caused the plaintiff to be prosecuted for the crimes of larceny and 
forgery stemming from the same alleged underlying facts. Plaintiff was 
convicted of both crimes in the Municipal Court for the City of 
Boston at a trial where the defendant was the only prosecution witness. 
On appeal, plaintiff was acquitted of the larceny charge on verdict 
2 Stapleton v. Cohen, S5S Mass. 5S, 228 N.E.2d 64 (1967); Campbell v. Romano., 
M6 Mass. S61, 191 N.E.2d 764 (100s); Richmond v. Warren Institution for Savings, 
S07 Mass. 48S, SO N.E.2d 407 (1940). 
8 Dolan v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank, 1969 Ma.ss. Adv. Sh. at 626, 246 N.E.2d 
at 800. 
4 294 Mass. 562, S N .E.2d 2S6 (19S6). 
IS 291 Mass. 100, 195 N.E. 896 (19S5). 
§1.l2. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 185, 244 N.E.2d 580. 
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directed by the superior court. Apparently because the municipal 
court lacke4 felony jurisdiction over. the forgery court, no appeal was 
taken from this conviction. Alleging, ,that the convictions had been 
obtained only and solely upon the false testiinony of the defendant, 
induced by his desire to force the plaintiff into releasing civil claims 
against him, the plaintiff sued for malicious prosecution. Jury verdicts 
were returned for the plaintiff following the overruling of defendant's 
demurrer, the refusal to grant his requests for instructions, and the 
denial of his motions for directed verdict and a new trial. 
Ordinarily, a plaintiff is unable .to sustain his burden of proving that 
the criminal charges were institute~ against him without probllble 
cause when he has been convicted in the tribunal to which complaint 
was made. Indeed, the. general rule is that a conviction, even though 
reversed on appeal, "is.conclusive proof of probable cause [unless it] 
was obtained solely by false testimony of the defendant [or is] im-
peached on some ground recogn~ed by the law, such as fraud, con-
spiracy, perjury or subornation of perjury as its sole foundation."2 
In filing his demurrer and motion for directed verdict, the defendant 
argued that plaintiff had not 1!11staiJ;led ,his burden because the convic-
tions had followed not only hit' testimony but. also . th~ testimony of 
plaintiff and two other witnesses. In upholding the triaJ c~urt,the 
Supreme Judicial Court found the testimony of plaintiff and "his 
supporting witnesses had been ~rected to minimal points and ruled 
that it "did not preclude a decisipn that the conviction was obtained 
solely upon the false testimony of the defendant."s Distinguishing 
prior cases,' the Court stated it 
... has never said ,that the defendant charged with crime in a 
district court is in the dilemma of exercising his right to testify in 
his own defense at the peril of renouncing another right at a later 
trial to impeach the conviction for iIilptoper Cdndud, of the 
complainant, and thus to demonstrate that 'the finding of guilt 
of the judge is entitled to no independent value. II ' 
The trial court ruled that the forgery convict;ion was' not cOl!clusive 
proof of the existence of probable cause b~cause th~ municipal. court 
had lacked jurisdictio:p over the crime, and further. ~pstructed. the jury 
that the issue remained one for its determination base~l upon all the 
evidence. Approving this charge; the Supreme.J udicial Court also 
2Id. at 186. 244 N.E.2d at 582. citing Magaletta v. Millard. 546 Mass. 591, 596. 
195 N.E.2d824. 826 (1964); BroUslard v. Great Atl. Be Pac. Tea Co .• 824 Mass. 828. 
826. 86 N.E.2d 489, 440 (1949); Dunn v. E. E. Gray Co .• 254 Mass. 202. 208·204. 
150 N.E.2d 166, 167 (1926); Wingenky v:E. E. Gray eo., 254 Mass. 198, 201, 150 
N.E. 164. 165 (1926). 
8 Dolan v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 188. 244 N.E.2d 
at 588. 
'Carere v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 259 Mass. 288. 156, N.E.2d 55 (1927); Dennehey 
v. Woodsum. 100 Mass. 195 (1868). ' 
II Dolan v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 190, 244 N.E.2d 
at 584. 
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held it to be im:material that the municipal court judge should have 
bouIid the plaintiff over to the grand jury if he were satisfied of the 
existence of probable cause of plaintifFs guilt, since in fact the judge 
did not do so. 
In mother case, Smith v. Eliot Savings Bank,8 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that it wasiInproper to direct a verdict for the defendant 
in a malicious prosecution action based on the complaints of a bank 
teller chargjng the plaintiff with the crimes of forgery, uttering and 
larceny, whitb.· complaints were made seven months after the teller 
had handled a single bank transaction which lasted only a matter of 
minute~. The identification was made under circumstances which 
were less than ideal since the teller h!ld accompanied the police at the 
interrogation of the plaintiff. In remanding the case, the Court said, 
"the jury could have fpund that the identification was so suspect that 'a 
man of ordinary caution and prudence' would not have relied upon 
it.'" Over the bank's objection, the Court held the bank responsible 
for the teller's action. The plaintiff had established more than a mere 
employer-employee relationship and. was not relying solely upon the 
"ostensible scope" of the employee's authority. The bank's treasurer 
had known about the unlawful withdrawals and, on at least three 
occasions, had discussed them together with police detectives and the 
teller. On the day of the identification, the treasurer gave the teller 
permission to accompany a detective, knowing that they were going 
on business which concerned the bank and that there was talk about a 
prosecution to be initiated. Against this background, the Court felt 
the jury reasonably could have fou~d authority in the teller to sign 
the criminal complaints on the bank's behalf. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§1.13. Medicial immunity: Practical nurses. The legislature has 
again amended the good samaritan statute.1 As originally enacted in 
1962, the statute provided that any licensed physician who, in good 
faith, rendered emergency care or treatment at the scene of a motor 
vehicle accident was exempt from civil liability for any acts or omis-
sions on his part and for expenses incurred by hospitals when he 
ordered a person hospitalized or caused his admission.1 Two years 
later this protection was extended to physicians residing in other 
states and duly registered therein.8 The following year, licensed phy-
sicians living in the District of Columbia and in Canada were also 
covered .• At the same time, the limitation confining the protection to 
8 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 499, 246 N.E.2d 4!17. 
TId. at 50!!, 246 N.E.2d at 440. 
§1.1!1. 1 G.L, c. 112. §12B. 
I Acts of 1962. c. 217. , 
8 Acts of 1964. c. 59. In 1965, licensed physicians residing in the District of 
Columbia and in Canada were also covered. 
'Acts of 1965. c. 578. 
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motor vehicle accidents was deleted and the immunity extended to any 
physician "who, in good faith, as a volunteer and without fee, renders 
emergency care or treatment, other than in the ordinary course of his 
practice."G Licensed registered nurses were first covered by the statute 
in 19676 and its provisions have now been extended to includeprotec-
tion of licensed p~ctical nurses.1 
§1.14. Torts by minors: Parental responsibility. A new law now 
imposes vicarious liability upon parents for . certain torts of their 
minor children. Section 85G, which has been added to Chapter 2811 
of the General Laws, provides, 
. Parents of· an unemancipated child under the age of seventeen 
and over the age of seven years shall be liable in a civil action 
for any wilful act committed by said child which results in injury 
or death to another person or damage to the property of another. 
It further provides that the liability shall not exceed $800 and does 
not extend to parents who, as a result of a judicial decree, do not have 
custody of their child at the time of the commission of the tort. This 
statute raises substantial constitutional issues since the $800 limitation 
indicates that it is punitive, not compensatory, in nature, and that 
custody of the child, not fault of the parent, is the basis of parental 
liability. 
§1.15. Conversion: Return of leased personalty. Another amend-
ment to Chapter 281 of the General Laws adds a new Section 85H, 
which provides, 
. . . failure to return any pe.-sonal property acquired by a 
person under a lease or contract of hire or rental . . . within 
thirty days after notice in writing of the termination . . . shall 
create a presumption that said person converted such property 
to his own use.1 
The termination notice must be delivered in hand by a sheriff or 
constable or sent by registered mail to the possessor of the property. 
§I.l6. Nuisance.· General Laws. c. 91, §59A,1 permits the recovery 
of double damages from any person who negligently pumps or dis-
charges petroleum products or bilge water into waterways or tidal 
GIbid. 
6 Acts of 1967. c. 1174. During the same &elSion. the legislature also inserted a 
new §12C to G.L. c. 112. which exempts physicianJ and nurses "administering 
immunization or other protective progwams under public health programs" from 
civil liability "as a result of any act or omission on his part in carrying out his 
duties." Acts of 1967. c. !109. 
7 Acts of 1969. c. 1148. 
§1.l4. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 458. 
§1.l5. 1 Acts of 1969. c. 467. 
§1.l6. 1 Inserted by Acts of 1967. c. 507. 
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flats so as to cause injury to the property of another. Chapter 373 of 
the Acts of 1969 exempts from the operation of this section injury 
caused by the spraying of pesticides on an area declared to be a breed-
ing place of mosquitoes or other insects by appropriate state or local 
authorities provided the use conforms to the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the pesticide board. 
§1.17. Unfair competition: Trade secrets. Chapter 93 of the 
General Laws has been amended by the insertion of a new Section 
42A, providing injunctive relief for the misappropriation of trade 
secrets, "including orders or decrees restraining and enjoining the 
respondent from taking, receiving, concealing, assigning, transferring, 
leasing, pledging, copying or otherwise using or disposing of a trade 
secret, regardless of value:'l 
C. STUDENT COMMENT 
§1.l8. Master-servant relationship: The right of control: Konick 
v. Berke, Moore Co.1 Berke, Moore Company was the employer of 
an individual whose privately owned vehicle struck and injured the 
plaintiffs. At the time of the accident, the employee was a salaried 
timekeeper at a construction site in Chelsea at which the employer 
was the general contractor. When the employee was instructed to 
"jump in the car and get the payroll" from the company office in 
Boston, he used his own automobile, and while en route to the 
company office, struck the plaintiffs, two minors.2 The plaintiffs 
brought an action in tort against both the employee and the employer, 
charging that the employer was liable for the torts of his employee 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The trial court granted 
the defendant employer's motion for a directed verdict, basing its 
decision on the Massachusetts rule that no liability is imposed on an 
employer through th..e doctrine of respondeat superior when he had 
no right to control the method and manner in which the employee 
conducted himself at the time of the accident.s 
The plaintiffs appealed. In reversing the lower court and ordering 
a new trial, the Supreme Judicial Court HELD: The master-servant 
relationship could exist and result in employer liability even though 
the employer had no right to control the manner and means of the 
operation of the vehicle by his employee, as long as the employee was 
acting within the scope of his employment. 
The decision is a significant departure from the rule laid down in a 
series of Massachusetts decisions which had held that the crucial test 
in determining the existence of the master-servant relationship was the 
right of the employer to control the details of the operation of the 
§1.17. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 457. 
§1.18. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 405, 245 N.E.2d 750. 
2Id. at 406, 245 N.E.2d at 751. 
SId. at 468, 245 N.E.2d at 752. 
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vehicle, including the route and speed of the .vehicleapd the em-
ployee's mode of driving .• This test had its inception in the case of 
Pyyny v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. IS In Pyyny. a traveling salesman was 
involved in an automobile colli~ion. The injured party sought recovery 
against the employer of the salesman, and in his argument, suggested 
that since the employer had the right to control the salesm,an, a master-
servant relationship existed, thereby mak,ing him liable. un~er the 
doctrine of respondeat superior. The employer denied that he eve:r 
had the ~ght to control the salesman. He claimed that the salesman 
had purchased and registered the vehicle in his own name and had 
obtained a license to operate it on his own initiative. without. any 
requirement tha~ he do so by.the employer. Since theve1;ll~le was the 
salesman's property and since the license to operate it created a rela-
tionship between the salesman and the Commonwealth, the employer 
contended that he had no right to control the purpose for which the 
car was used. He also alleged that because he was under no obligation 
to make any repairs on the salesman's vehicle, he had no rights, in-
terests, duties or obligations.toward it.6 Finally, he argued that he had 
no means of control over the salesman, since the salesman had ·no 
regular work hours and could solicit orders at his own convenience 
anywhere within a designated territory.7 The Court was persuaded 
by these arguments and found that, since the employer' had neither 
the right to control the salesman's automobile nor the· right to control 
the use of it by the salesman, the master-servant relationship did not 
exist, and the employer could not be held liable under thr doctrine of 
respondeat superior.. . 
In the next major case, Khouryv. Edison Electric Illuminating Co .• s 
the defendant employer. denied' liability for injurieS' caused by an 
. employee and argued that because the employee used his own vehicle 
at his own election and convenience,.' the employer had no right to 
control the manner in which the employee \}Sed the vehicle, and 
therefore, he should not be held liable for any injuries caused by the 
employee. As evidence of his lack of control, the employer introduced 
arguments similar to those found in Pyyny. For example, the employer 
stated that: 
• . . It was the duty of Parnell [the employee] to register his 
automobile and to obtain a lic~nse to operate it., The defendant 
[employer] did not requireo,r request Parnell to use his auto-
mobile in the business .... 8 
The Court also noted that: "The defendant assumed no' obligation 
• Gladney v. Holland Ftlrnace Cd., 536 Mus. 366, 145 N.E~d 694 (1957); Hailer 
v. American Tool" Machine Co., 288 MalIS. 66, 192 N.E. 315 (1954). 
1S255 MalIS. 574, 149 N.E. 541 (1925). 
6Id. at 576, 149 N.E. at 542. 
'lId. at 575, 149 N.E. at 542 •. ' 
s 265 Mass. 236, 164 N.E. 77 (1928). 
8Id. at 239, 164 N.E. at 78. 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 4
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/4
§1.18 TORTS 29 
to keep the auto in repair; that duty rested upon Parnell, its owner."IO 
The evidence was again persuasive, and the Court decided not to 
impose liability on the employer, basing its decision on the premise 
that the vehicle was the property of the employee and that the em-
ployer had neither rights, interests, duties or obligations in the prop-
erty, nor the right to control its use by the employee.11 
Wescott v. Henshaw Motor CO.12 represented a change of emphasis. 
In Wescott, the Court again recognized the private property argument 
but went on to say that: 
[i]t [the vehicle] was under the control of Young [the employee] 
and the defendant [employer] had no power to control the way in 
which it was to be operated. The defendant had no right to direct 
the employee Young in any particular way he should go, the course 
he should go, the course he should take, the speed of the vehicle, 
or his mode of driving the automobile. [Emphasis added.]IS 
This statement was significant because it represented a distinction in 
the tyPe of evidence necessary to show a lack of control by the em-
ployer. WhiJe in Pyyny and Khoury it was sufficient to show that an 
employer had no duties or obligations to repair or maintain the 
vehicle in order to establish the employer's lack of control, the Wescott 
Court relied on this lack of employer control over the details of the 
automobi~e's operation to relieve the employer of liability. 
The Court continued to follow the Wescott formula in Hailer v. 
American Tool & Machine CO.14 and Gladney v. Holland Furnace CO.III 
by concerning itself with the failure of employers to instruct their 
employees in the operating details of their vehicles, including the 
speed, route and mode of operation to be used. This continued to be: 
the law up to the time of the Konick decision. 
Against this background of cases, the decision in Konick is a decisive 
departure from precedent because the specific evidentiary test used· 
to determine whether an employer had the right to control an em-
ployee is discarded. An examination of the failings of the test should 
make the policy basis of Konick clear. 
The first inadequacy of requiring the employer to control the details 
of the operation of the automobile was that this often resulted in the 
employer not being held liable for injuries which arose from transac-
tions the employer created and from which he stood to benefit. For 
instance, under the Pyyny rule, an employee could always be required 
to use his own automobile on the business of the employer. Because he f rp • 
was using his own vehicle, liability for any injuries the employee 
caused fell solely upon the employee, absent control by the employer 
10Id. at 259, 164 N.E. at 79. 
11 Id. at 240, 164 N.E. at 79. 
12275 Mass. ~2, 175 N.E. 155 (1951). 
18 Yd. at 87, 1'75 N.E. at 155-156. 
14288 Mass. 66,192 N.E. 515 (1954). 
111 556 Mass. 566, 145 N.E.2d 694 (1957). 
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over the "details of operation." By comparison, an employee who used 
his own vehicle on his employer's business and was told the details of 
the operation of the \ vehicle avoided sole liability, and' liability was 
also imposed on the employer. Thus, all the employer had to do in 
order to avoid liability in all cases was require all employees to use 
their own vehicles but give no specific instructions as to the method 
or manner of operation. Indeed, as the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
stated: 
. . . If that were to be the test, an employer could never be 
held [liable] except in cases of willful wrong in giving instructions 
to an employee who later executes such wrongful instructions 
faithfully. IS 
The origin of this anomalous situation wherein an employer may 
avoid liability seems to be the historical policy of organized govern-
ment to encourage and assist business enterprises.1'/' The courts have 
traditionally protected employers and businesses from undue hardships 
on the ability to do business by insulating them from recoveries arising 
from the torts of their employees, except in the rigorous and narrow 
circumstances where the employer had the right to control the details 
of the employee's activities. This being the case, one must ask whether 
such motivations have any releVance today when the natures of living 
and doing business have so markedly changed. 
In this respect, the words of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
stand out: . 
. . . The argument maybe made that the rule established by 
these [Pyyny-type] cases, which is a minority rule, is less satis-
factory in its application to modern business than it appeared' to 
be when it was announced about thirty years ago.1S 
If we accept this premise, then' the basic policy justification of the 
IS K.ohl v. Albert Lifson Be Sons, 128 N.J.L. 575, 575, 25 A.2d 925, 927 (1942). 
17 In Massachusetts, empJoyers have traditionally been relieved of liability for 
injuries to third persons caused by their employees when they have no "control of 
the mannerapd means"of the operation of vehicles by employees. This policy was 
originally applied to accidents involving horses and carriages and was only later 
applied by analogy to motor vehicles. See Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416, 63 N.E. 
922 (1902). However, a comment to the Restatement of Agency states: 
". . . It is probably .true ~t );lefore ,the nineteenth century the master was not 
normally responsible for the unoomm,anded acts of the servant, at least for those 
which did not enure' to the master's benefit. However, with the growth of large 
enterprises, it became increasingly apparent that it would be unjust to permit an 
employer to gain from the intelligent cooperation of others without being responsi-
ble for the mistakes"the errors of' judgments and the frailties of those working 
under his direction and for his benefit. As a result of these considerations, 
historical and economic, the courts of today have worked out tests which are 
helpful in predicting whether there is such a relationship between the parties that 
liability will be imposed upon the employer for the employee'. conduct which 
is in the scope of employment." 1 Restatement of Agency Second §219,Comment 
4. 
18 Ross v. Robert'. Exprell Co., 100 N.H. 98, 102, 120A.2d !illS, 358 (1956). 
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Pyyny decisiQn is no IQnger valid, and CQurts shQuld no' IQnger allQw 
emplQyers and businesses to' benefit frQm this anachronism in ,the law. 
A secQnd failing Qf the Pyyny cQntrQI test was the fact that employees 
were held sQlely liable fQr injuries sustained by third persQns when 
the risks which resulted in the injuries were primarily incident to' the 
seeking Qf benefit fQr the emplQyers. The philQSQphical problem of 
hQlding employees liable in this situatiQn was articulated by Justice 
CardQZQ when he commented: 
... UnquestiQnably injury thrQugh cQllisiQn is a risk Qf travel 
Qn a highway. What CQncerns us here is whether the risks ~f 
travel are also' risks Qf the emplQyment. In that view the decisive 
test must be whether it is the emplQyment Qr sQmething else that 
has sent the traveler fQrth uPQn the jQurney Qr brought exposure 
to' its perils.19 
Using the IQgic Qf this PQsitiQn, it WQuld seem that since the em-
plQyee has been placed in a positiQn of risk in Qrder to' benefit the 
emplQyer,the risk as well as the benefit shQuld be ascribed to' the 
emplQyer. In Qther wQrds, the risk Qf liability fQr injuries caused by 
an emplQyee is a risk Qf dQing business rather than a risk Qf employ-
ment, and shQuld fall Qn the emplQyer, nQt the emplQyee. 
The Pyyny test perpetuated this! fundamental unfairness tQward 
emplQyees and bestQwed a cQncQmitant unjustified privilege upon 
emplQyers. Viewed in this light, the decisiQn Qf the Supreme Judicial 
CQurt in Konick, that it WQuld no' IQnger fQllQW the case law to th~ 
extent that it utilized an anachronistic and fundamentally unfair 
contrQI test, must be viewed as a significant step tQward bringing 
the master-servant relatiQnship Qut Qf the 19th century and into' the 
present. 
The CQurt, hQwever, made no' attempt to' Qutline the specific tests 
which it deemed relevant in finding cQntrQI, but it did refer to' cas~ 
which "suggest that the crucial questiQn is the right to. cQntrQI the 
driver's general activities, nQt the physical cQntrQI of the car.2O If 
never fQrmally accepted this principle as a rule of law, but instea4, 
remanded the case fQr a new trial on the basis of the erroneously 
directed verdict fQr the defendant, Berke, MQQre CQmpany. Since die 
CQurt did nQt set fQrth a test, it is necessary to' analyze decisiQns in the 
majQrity jurisdictiQns in Qrder to' derive the relevant test. 
One Qf two' distinct relatiQnships may be created when Qne persOn 
emplQys anQther to render services fQr him in an area Qther than c;,On-
tractual dealin:gs with third parties.21 The first is an empIQyer-em-
19 Matter of Marks v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 93, 167 N.E. 181-182 (1929). 
20 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 408, 245 N.E.2d at 752. 
21 Both a servant and an independent contractor perform services for an em-
ployer which do not relate to representing the employer in contractual. dealings 
with third parties. These situations are distinguished from the situation of the 
agent, who is a person retained by another called a principal to deal with third 
parties contractually on behalf of the principal. It is noted that "The word 'em-
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ployee or master-servant relationship, and the second is the indepen-
dent contractor relationship. The primary distinction between these 
two is that in the employer-employee relationshlp, the employer has 
the right to control the details of the employee's performance of 
services, . while the employer of the independent contractor has no 
such right of controI.22 As a consequence of his right to contro~ an 
employee, the employer is held liable for the t()rts of his employee if 
these torts were committed while the person was acting w,ithin ·the 
scope of his employment and in the furtherance of 1$ employer's 
business.23 Similarly, because th~ employer has no right to control the 
actions of the independent contractor, he is generally not held liable 
for his torts.24 Control is the key to finding the. existence of the 
employer-employee relationship and the related liability of the em-
ployer. 
In finding control as the basis of employer liability, the majority of 
jurisdictions follow the rule referred to in Konick: ..... the crucial 
question' is the right to corttrol the driver's general activities, not the 
physicial control of the car."211 One of the jurisdictions which utilizes 
a general activities basis for liability is Nebraska. In a case in which 
ployee' is commonly used in current statutes [and practice] to indicate the type of 
person herein described [in the Restatement of Agency] as servant." 1 Restatement 
of Agency Second §2, Comment d. . 
22 1 Restatement of Agency §§ 2(2) and (lI) distinguish between the servant and 
the independent contractor as follow!!: 
(2) A servant is ••• employed by,a master to perform service in bis affairs whose 
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlJed or is subject to 
the right to control by the master. . 
"(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do 
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the 
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance 
of the undertaking." , , 
23 "The conception of the mast~r's liability to third persons appears to be an 
outgrowth of the idea that within the time of service, the master can exercise 
control over the physical' activities of the Servant. From this, the idea of responsi. 
bility for the harm done by the' servant's activities followed naturally. The as-
sumption of control is a usual basis fOr imposing tort liability when the thing 
controlled causes ,harm. It is U"Ue ~t.normally one in control of tangible things 
is not liable without fault. But in the' law of master and servant the Use of the 
fiction that 'the act of the 'servant .is the act of the master' has made it seem fair 
to subject the nonfaulty',employer to liability' for the negligent and other faulty 
conduct of his servants." 1 Restatement of Agency Second §219, Comment 4. 
See Hackett, Why Is a ,Master Liable.for the. Tort of His Servant, 7 Harv. L. 
Rev. 107 (IS93); Laski, The nasis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L.J. 105 (1916); 
Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, liS Yale L.J. 5S4 (1929); 
Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 Ill. L. Rev. lI39 (1934). 
24 Noting that "the assumption of control is a usual basis for imposing tort liability 
when the thing controlled causes harm," under the .Restatement definition of 
independent contractor' as one "who is not controlled by the. other nor is subject 
to the other's right of control,"· there.is no basis for imposing tort liability on the 
employer for .the torts· of the independent contractor. 
211 Konick v. Berke, MOOlTe Co., ,1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 4OS, 245 N.E.2d at 752. 
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a traveling salesman was found to be an employee and not an inde-
pendent contractor, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated: 
... It seems to us that the control of the automobile is not the 
dominant feature. It is a question of the control of the driver 
of the automobile by the employer, as distinguished from the 
physical control of the car that to us seems the more important 
factor. We believe the proper rule to be as follows: Where an em-
ployer expressly or impliedly authorizes the use of an automobile 
owned by an employee in the pursuit of his duties, the employer 
is liable to innocent third persons for injuries resulting from its 
negligent use by the employee in the business of his employer.26 
Two points are evident from this statement. First, the court made 
it quite clear that the control of the details of the operation of the 
car was a less preferable basis for imposing liability on the employer 
than the determination that the employer h,ad the capacity to control 
the general activities of the employee. Second, the court indicated that 
a finding of either express or implied authority was sufficient evidence 
of the employer's control over the employee to warrant the imposition 
of liabiUty upon the employer. 
Evidence of such autl,J.orization can be quite varied. In United States 
v. Farmer27 the court concluded that under Iowa law, the United 
States was liable for injuries to a third person who was injured by 
an army national guardsman who was traveling by private conveyance. 
As evidence of the government's right to control its employee, the 
court noted that the government had expressly ordered the soldier 
to proceed to his home base. In terms of implied authority, the court 
noted that the government allowed the guardsman to travel by private 
automobile and gave him a travel allowance to cover the costs of 
travel by private conveyance. It also recognized that the soldier re-
mained on active duty while traveling and continued to be paid 
during ,that time.28 The court was persuaded by this evidence of 
authorization and found that it was indicative of control. Thus, liabil-
ity was imposed on the government. 
While the court in applying Iowa law held that authorization by 
an employer was evidence of control, other jurisdictions have held 
that a lack of authorization does not mean control is absent. For 
instance, in Pelletier v. Bilbiles29 the Connecticut Supreme Court 
stated, "The fact that the specific method a servant employs to ac-
complish his master's orders is not authorized does not relieve the 
master from liability."30 However, the question still remained as to 
26 Peterson v. Brinn &: Jensen Co., 134 Neb. 909, 911, 280 N.W. 171. 172 (1938). 
27 400 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1968). 
28 Id. at 11 0-111. 
29154 Conn. 544. 227 A.2d 251 (1967). 
80 Id. at 548, 227 A.2d at 253. 
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how, and in what circumstances, the court would find control and 
impose liability on an employer. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court answered this by indicating a dif-
ferent control test: "The law imputes to the principal or master 
responsibility for the negligent acts of his agent or servant done . . . 
within the scope of the employee's authority or employment in his 
master's business . ... "81 (Emphasis added.) 
In determining whether an employee· has acted within the scope 
of his employment in his master's business, commonly called "in 
the furtherance of his master's business," the courts have distinguished 
three types of cases. In the first type of case, where the employee 
served the purpose of the master and at the same time served no 
purpose of his own, the courts have held that the employee was 
acting in the furtherance of his master's business, and have imposed 
liability solely on the employer. 
Thus, in Cooner v. United States.82 a case in which an army major 
was involved in a collision with another vehicle while en route to a 
new duty station, the court found the government liable to the 
plaintiffs and said: 
[N]o one factor is controlling, but the question is, taking 
everything into consideration, whether the person causing the 
injury is the defendant's servant, and whether he is, at the time 
of the accident, engaged in his own or in his master's business. 
Certainly, under the principles evolved in the New York cases, 
he was a servant primarily on his master's business, rather than 
his own. He was, to repeat, performing a specific duty under 
explicit directions to do so. . • . He had no personal motive in 
making the trip.88 
In the second type of case, where the courts have found that the 
employee has clearly been serving a purpose of his own while not 
serving any purpose of the master, the master has been relieved of 
liability. Thus, the employer of a truck driver was not held liable 
for the injuries suffered by a third. person when the truck driver 
deviated substantially from the directions and route given by the 
employer and was thereafter involved in a collision.84 
Where. the employee has either failed to comply strictly with 
the instructions of the master or has served a purpose of his own at 
the same time he has been serving the purpose of the master, the 
courts have held the employer liable.811 For example, in United States 
81 Van Auker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co., 148 Neb. 24, 80-81, 8 N.W. 2d 
451, 455 (1943). 
82276 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1960). 
88 Id. at 284. 
84 Mosqueda v. Albright Transfer Be Storage Co., 820 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1959). 
811 This is the so-called dual purpose rule. See I Restatement of Agency Second 
§286. 
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v. Mra%,88 a case in which an air force officer detoured to do some 
sightseeing while en route to a new duty station, the court quoted 
from a Washington state case which held that: 
Where the servant is combining his own business with that 
of his master, or attending to both at substantially the same 
time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business the 
servant was actually engaged in when a third person was injured; 
but the master will be held responsible, unless it clearly appears 
that the servant could not have been directly or indirectly serv-
ing his master.S7 
Thus the employer was held liable if the acts were done while the 
employee was acting in the furtherance of the master's business and 
the acts did not "arise wholly from some external, independent and 
personal motive on the part of [the servant]."88 
If it cannot be determined that the employee has been acting in 
the furtherance of the master's business, the court in Van Auker v. 
Steckley's Hybrid Seed Com CO.89 states that it is only necessary to 
show that the servant "acted within the scope of [his] authority" in 
order to have liability imposed on the employer.4o By this, the court 
meant that where there was neither an express nor implied authoriza-
tion for an employee to engage in an activity on behalf of the 
employer, control was established if there were some indicia of 
apparent authority whereby the employee's capacity to perform certain 
activities was derived from his general competence to act on the 
master's behalf. Thus it should be noted that real authority is not 
necessary to establish control, but rather, co~trol can also be estab-
lished by a showing of apparent authority.41· 
In Konick the Court discarded the Pyyny control test because it was 
fundamentally unfair in allowing employers to avoid liability in all 
but the narrowest of circumstances. The tests for employer control 
and liability found in Van A uker seem to give the best assurance that 
responsibility will be placed on employers for injuries resulting from 
business-related risks, while at the same time reducing the possibility 
that only the employee will be burdened with liability which is prop-
erly attributable to his employer. In this respect, the courts of Massa-
chusetts should find the requisite control where there is (I) express or 
implied authority for the employee to act on behalf of the employer; 
or where there is (2) apparent authority for the employee to act on 
behalf of the employer (provided that the employee does not violate 
88255 F.2d 115 (lOth Cir. 1958). 
87Id. at 117, citing Carmin v. Port of Seattle, 10 Wash. 2d 11l9, 154, 116 P.2d 111l8, 
1144 (1941). 
88Id. at 118; see Grant v. Singer Mfg. Co., 190 Mass. 489,77 N.E. 480 (1906). 
891411 Neb. 24, 8 N.W.2d 451 (19411). 
40 Id. at 1l0·1l1, 8 N.W.2d at 455. 
41 n ·d. See also Keener v. Jack Cole Trucking Co. 21111 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Ky. 
1964); Alterman v. Lydick. 241 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1{J1i'l). 
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the specific instructions of the employer); or where (~) the act. is 
done within the scope of employment in the master's business, that 
is, in the furtherance of the master's business. 
CHARLES BLUMSACK 
§1.19. Nondisclosure: Half-truth doctrine: Kannavos v. ~O.l 
On June 28 and July 12, 1965, the plaintiffs, Apostolos C. Kannavos, 
his wife and John G. Bellas, purchased several multi-family housing 
units from Annino Realty Trust and others, the defeJldants. An ad-
vertisement2 had been placed by the defendants in a newspaper 
offering their real estate for sale. The advertisement stressed the 
income earning aspects of the realty. Plaintiffs, who were interested 
in acquiring income producing real estate, saw the advertisement 
and inquired about the property. Defendants furnished the plaintiffs 
with the rental income and, expense reports while they showed the 
plaintiffs the property. The defendants also told the plaintiffs that 
the units were rented as multi-family units 'and that the plaintiffs 
could continue to operate them as such.3 
The real estate involved here was originally purchased by the 
defendants in 1961 and 1962 as'single family houses. Each house 
was located in an,~ea zoned only for single family residences. Despite 
the zoning restrictions and the lack of necessary building permits, 
the defendants had converted the property . into multi-familY apart-
ment houses. The defendants· knew that the zoning ordinances pro-
hibited using the realty as multi-family units;. however, at the time 
of the sale, the property was still being operated in violation of such 
regulations. During the negotiations with the plaintiffs, the defen-
dants failed to disclose the fact that the zoning restrictions were being 
violated or that the defendants lacked the required building permits. 
Because the plaintiffs had had no prior experience in real estate 
transactions, they asked the defendants no questions about the zoning 
codes or building' permits. The negotiations were conducted· by the 
plaintiffs without the aid of an attorney. The defendants said nothing 
actually false or fraudulent; the' plaintiffs cOmplained of no' verbal 
misrepresentations. ' . 
On July 26, 1965, after the plaintiffs had purchased the real estate, 
the city of Springfield 'notified them that they were' operating the 
properties in·violation of hoththe'zoning ordinances and the building 
codes.1I The oity then brought civil proceedings to abate the use of 
§1.l9. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. SUI, 247 N.E.2d 708. 
:I Id. at S14, 247 N.E.2d at 709. The advertisement stated: "Income gross $9600 
yr. in Ig. single house, converted to S lovely, completely fum. (indud. TV and 
china) apts. S baths, ideal fot couple to live free, with ~cellent income. By apt. 
[sic] only. Foote Realty." , 
3Id. at S15-S16, 247 N.E.2d at 710. 
4Id. at SI4,247 N.l!:.2dat 709. 
II Id. at SI6, 247 N.E.2d at 710. 
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the properties as multi-family dwellings.6 The plaintiffs brought a 
bill in equity to rescind. The suits in equity were heard in the 
superior court on a master's report,7 where a decision for the plaintiffs 
was reached. 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the Court affirmed the 
lower court's decision and HELD: (1) The defendants had done and 
said enough so that they were bound to do more to avoid deception 
of the plaintiff,8 and (2) Plaintiffs' failure to conduct a reasonable 
investigation was not a bar to recovery.9 The Court found that the 
defendants' advertisement, rental income and expense reports, and 
statement that the plaintiffs could continue to operate the properties 
as multi-family units were not false in and of themselves but that 
taken together misled the· plaintiffs.10 The Court concluded that 
having made these representations, the defendants were under a· 
further duty to disclose that the premises were being operated unlaw-
fully.ll The result of this failure to disclose in conjunction with the 
statements actually made was to create an actionable misrepresenta-
~ion.12 
Implicit in the Court's finding that the defendants were liable is 
a reaffirmation of the doctrine of no liability for bare nondisclosure, IS 
in respect to which the Court has said: 
We assume that, if the vendors [defendants] had been wholly 
silent and had made no reference whatsoever to the use of the 
. . . houses, they could not have been found to have made any 
misrepresentation.14 
This doctrine of no duty to disclose in the absence of other state-
ments or circumstances raising such a duty has existed in the law 
since the decision in 1873 of Peek v. Gurney.15 In 1942, Swinton v. 
Whitinsville Savings Bank16 firmly established that doctrine in Massa-
chusetts. Swinton was an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer 
to the declaration by the plaintiffs that the defendant had fraudulently 
concealed the existence of termites in a house sold to the plaintiffs. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in affirming the lower court's order, 
said that absent a relationship of trust or confidence between the 
parties, false statements, or attempts to prevent the plaintiff from 
6 Ibid. 
7Id. at 813, 247 N.E.2d at 708. 
8Id. at 820, 247 N.E.2d at 712. 
9 Ibid. 
10Id. at 820, 247 N.E.2d at 713. 
11 Ibid. 
12 For general reference to nondisclosure and the duty to disclose, see Keeton, 
Fraud~oncea1ment and Non-Disclosure, 15 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1936). 
1S Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942); 
WindJ;am Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 131 N.E. 454 (1921). 
14 Kannavos v. Annino, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 817, 247 N.E.2d at 710. 
15 L.R. 6 H.L. 377, [1861-1875] All E.R. 116 (1873). 
16311 Mass. 677,42 N.E.2d 808 (1942). 
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obtaining information, the defendant had no duty to disclose any 
information. IT The Court felt that the difficulty that the plaintiffs 
might have in discovering the defect had no bearing on the defen-
dants' duty to disclose that defect.ls 
The rule of no liability for bare nondisclosure is applied by a 
majority of jurisdictions.19 However, several jurisdictions have broken 
away from the Swinton rule.2O The courts in· these jurisdictions 
require a vendor to disclose all material facts21 even in the absence 
of either a relationship of trust or confidence or misleading statements; 
one such jurisdiction is California. An example of the California 
approach is Kallgren v. Steele,'2t where the plaintiff purchased a 
mountain resort which had been operated for 80 years. At the time 
of the purchase the defendant vendor failed to inform the plaintiff 
that the resort had been built so as to encroach on the public highway. 
Mter the sale, the plaintiff was notified that his permit to operate 
would be revoked because of the resort's encroachment on the high-
way. In an action for damages the court held that the vendor was 
under a duty to disclose the fact of the encroachment and that a 
vendor must disclose all facts which materially affect the desirability of 
the property.28 
The California rule results in liability for bare nondisclosure. The 
Massachusetts rule, however, produces liability only when something 
more is attributed to the defendant than mere nondisclosure. As a 
result, the Massachusetts rule creates a disparity of results which is 
eliminated under the Califomia rule. To illustrate, assume that 
vendors A and B have termites in their respective houses. Both houses 
are at the same stage of deterioration. The effects, however, of the 
termites can be seen in B's house, whereas in A's house the damage is 
invisible and hard to detect. B, before selling his house, hides the 
visible effects of the termites; his actions have not cured the defect 
but have merely made it undetectable. A sells his house without dis-
closing the termites. Under the Massachusetts rule, A would be free 
from any liability; B, however, would be liable since his actions in-
volve more than bare nondisclosure. Under the California rule, since 
lT Id. at 678, 42 N.E.2d at 808. 
18Id. at 679, 42 N.E.2d at 809: accord, Donahue v. Stephens, !l42 Mass. 89, 172 
N.E.2d 101 (1961): Spencer v. Gabriel, !l28 Mass. I, 101 N.E.2d !l69 (1951). 
19 2 Idaho L. Rev. 112 (1965): see, Henrick v. Lynn, !l7 Del. Ch. 402, 144 A.2d 147 
(1958): Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 22!1 (1958). 
20 2 Idaho L Rev. 112 (1965). 
21!1 Restatement of Torts §5!18. Subsection (2) atatet: "(2) A fact is material if 
(a) its existence or nonexistence is a matter to which a reasonable man would at-
tach importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question, 
or (b) the maker of the representation knows that its recipient is likely to regard 
the fact as important although a reasonable man would not 80 regard it." 
221!l1 Cal. App. 2d 4!1, 279 P.2d 1027 (1955): Kuhn v. Gottfried, 10!l Cal. App. 
2d 80, 229 P.2d 1!l7 (1951): accord Lingsch v. Savage, 21!1 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 
Cal. Rptr. 201 (196!I). 
28 Kallgren v. Steele, 1!l1 Cal. App.2d at 46, 279 P.2d at 1029. 
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the presence of tennites is material to the transaction, both vendon 
would be liable. Massachusettts requires some aflinnative action on the 
part of the vendor to find liability for nondisclosure. Therefore, 
liability will result only for extrinsic defects concealed but not for 
intrinsic defects not disclosed. 
The difference in results between the above hypothetical cases under 
the Massachusetts rule arises from a philosophy prevalent in the 
common law. The common law stressed the doctrine of caveat emptor. 
Although it was not proper for a vendor to use chicanery to take 
advantage of a purchaser, he was entitled to any benefits accruing 
from his shrewdness. Thus he was not required to disclose to a pur-
chaser all he knew. "The courts felt that they were not the protecton 
of morality, but the dispensen of the rule of law,"24 
The thrust of the Kannavos decision is that since the defendants 
made some statements about income from the property, they were 
bound to reveal all the infonnation which was necessary to prevent 
their statements from being deceptive and misleading.211 Kidney v. 
Stoddard26 is an early Massachusetts case dealing with the above prop-
osition. In Kidney, a father sent a letter to a merchant requesting that 
credit be extended to his son. Although the father indicated that his 
son would take care of all his accounts promptly, the father failed to 
mention his son's minority. The merchant, relying on the letter, sold 
the son merchandise on credit. When the son refused to pay the debt, 
the merchant sought to collect from the father, who also refused to 
pay.27 The merchant then brought suit against the father in an action 
of trespass on the case for fraudulent misrepresentation. The Court 
held that when some representations are made and material facts are 
concealed with an intent to deceive, the concealment is fraudulent.28 
Just as the defendant in Kidney knew that his son would not receive 
credit if his age were known, the defendants in Kannavos knew that 
if the zoning regulations were known, they would not be able to sell 
the property as multi-dwelling units. Thus, in such a case, any state-
ments which may be deceiving unless other infonnation is disclosed 
are fraudulent. 
By finding defendants liable on the basis of partial and incomplete 
statements, the Court appean to disregard the possibility that defen-
dants' statement that the plaintiff could continue to operate the 
property as multi-dwelling units29 may have been a fraudulent mis-
representation. In an earlier case, Bums v. Dockray,80 the Court said 
that statements which a seller knows are false, or the truth or falsity 
24 Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 5 W. 
Res. L. Rev. 5, 9 (1957). 
211 Kannavos v. Annino, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 820, 247 N.E.2d at 715. 
26 48 Mass. 252 (1845). 
21 Id. at 255. 
28 Id. at 255. 
291969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 815-816, 247 N.E.2d at 710. 
80156 Mass. 1l15, 50 N.E. 551 (1892). 
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of, which the seller is ignorant but which he stated as being true, are 
fraudulent misrepresentations.81 Burns involved representations made 
by a: seller of real· property that he could convey good title to the 
property.82 The vendor made this representation despite the fact that 
he knew he had obtained the property from a man who, shortly after 
the sale, was adjudged insane. The facts of Kannavos closely parallel 
those of Burns. The defendant in Kannavos like the one in Burns 
made a positive statement of fact. Each defendant knew that the 
actual state of facts was different than those they had represented. 
Both defendants therefore made expressly fraudulent miSrepresenta-
tions. 
The ambiguous manner in which the Court held that the defen-
dants' disclosure was inadequate gives rise to the question whether 
defendants' actions, if taken separately, would have resulted in liability 
for inadequate disclosure. The Court stated: "We conclude enough 
was done affirmatively to make disclosure inadequate and partial .... "38 
What constituted "enough"? To illustrate, the defendants' statement 
that plaintiffs could coIitinue to operate the property as multi-dwelling 
units should alone result in liability as a half-truth in that more had 
to be said so that the statement could be correctly understood. The 
advertisement and income statements taken individually should also 
render defendants liable. The advertisement emphasized the income 
producing aspects of the property and the income statements indicated 
to the plaintiffs exactly the amount of profit they could expect to make. 
When defendants said nothing to qualify either the advertisement or 
the income statement, their Silence constituted a tacit representation, 
indicating to the plaintiffs that there were no further facts to affect 
what they had already been told. The fact that the city could prevent 
the property from producing income at its present rate required dis-
closure. When the subject of income from the property was mentioned, 
all pertinent information relating thereto should have been revealed.34 
The Court categorically states that if the defendants had remained 
silent they would not have been liable.811 This statement ignores the 
implied representation arising from the actual income prOducing status 
and the appearance of the property. In French v. Vining,86 the Court 
stated that "A buyer has a right to believe that the thing sold is what it 
appears to be."8T The· property ap~ared as legally operated multi-
family units. The plaintiffsshotild have been able to rely on this 
81Id. at 187, 50 N.E. at 552. 
82Id. at 186, lIO N.E. at 552. 
881969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 820, 247 N.E.2d at 712. 
8'1n International Trust Co. v. Myers, 241 Mass. 509, 135 N.E. 697 (1922), 
rev'd on other grounds, 2611 u.s. 64 (192l1), the defendants supplied a copy of 
their income statement to the plaintiff. The defendants failed to state that their 
accounts receivable had been assigned. The Court held that the concealment was 
a material misrepresentation. 
811 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 817, 247 N.E.2d at 711. 
86 102 Mass. Il1l1 (1869). I 
87 Id. at Il16. 
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appearance. In addition, the sale of the property as multi-family units 
should be considered equivalent to an affirmation by the defendants 
of the apparent fact that they were being operated legally as stich. 
Thus the defendants should have been held liable without having 
made any statements to the plaintiff. 
Neither the plaintiffs in arguing the case38 nor the Court in deciding 
it referred to the Restatement of Contracts' treatment of the duty to 
disclose.s9 The Restatement requires that facts unknown by one party 
must be disclosed when those facts, if unknown by both parties, would 
be sufficient to render the contract voidable as a mutual mistake of 
subject matter.40 This section of the Restatement was used to grant 
rescission in Curran v. Heslop41 by the California District Court of 
Appeals. That case similarly involved nondisclosure of violations of 
building codes by the vendors of real property. As a result, the Restate-
ment's position would also have required rescission in the Kannavos 
case. The plaintiffs in Kannavos erroneously believed that the property 
was being operated legally as multi-family dwellings. If both parties 
had been unaware of the zoning violations the contract would have 
been voidable because of a mutual mistake in subject matter. Thus, 
according to the Restatement, the defendants have a duty to disclose 
the violation. 
Another analysis of the case is suggested by the Tentative Draft of 
the Restatement of Torts Second.42 The Restatement's approach 
would comply with Kannavos by finding liability for undisclosed 
matters which are necessary to prevent information already disclosed 
from being misleading.4s However, the Restatement also proposes that 
liability results when the undisclosed information is a fact "basic to 
the transaction."44 Facts basic to the transaction as perceived by the 
Restatement are facts that go to the essence of the contract.411 The 
essence of the contract in Kannavos was the sale and purchase of multi-
88 See Plaintiff's Brief. 
892 Restatement of Contracts §472 . 
• 0 A classic example of a mutual mistake of subject matter is Sherwood v. Walker, 
66 Mich. 568, 88 N.W. 919 (1887). The defendant sold to the plaintiff what both 
thought was a barren cow. Before delivery of the cow it was discovered that the cow 
was with calf. The defendant refused to deliver the cow. The court held that the 
contract was voidable since both parties had bargained about a barren cow. There 
existed a mutual mistake of subject matter • 
• 1115 Cal. App. 2d 476, 480, 252 P.2d 878, 880 (1958). 
42 Restatement of Torts Second §551 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965). 
"Id. at 42. §551(2) states: "One party to a business transaction is under a duty 
to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated . . . such additional 
matters as he knows or believes to be necessary to prevent his partial statement of 
facts from being misleading. • • ." 
44Id. at 42-48. §551(2) states: "One party to a business transaction is under a 
duty to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated • . • facts 
basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into the 
transaction under a mistake as to such facts, and that the other, because of the 
relationship between them, the customs in the trade, or other objective circum-
stances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of such facts." 
411Id. at 48. 
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family units for rental purposes. The fact that the property could 
legally be operated as such would be a fact basic to the transaction. 
The "fac;ts basic to the transaction" approach creates an affirmative 
duty of disclosure when one party knows or has reason to believe that 
the other party is under a mistake as to such facts. The Restatement 
attempts with this approachf6 to eliminate decisions such as Swinton 
v. Whitinsville Savings Bank"T The term "basic facts" parallels the 
term "material facts" as used in the Restatement of Contracts,,8 The 
Restatement of Torts distinguishes between basic facts and material 
facts as those facts respectively which go to the purpose of the contract 
and those that just serve as "important and persuasive inducements 
to enter into the contract."f9 According to the Restatement, the law 
may be moving in the direction of requiring disclosure of material 
facts but at the present time disclosure is only required of basic facts.1IO 
As stated above, the Restatements and cases from some jurisdictions 
require an affirmative duty to disclose material or basic facts. However, 
it appears from Kannavos that there is still no such duty in Massa-
chusetts. The law in Massachusetts will only adjudge silence to be a 
misrepresentation when the circumstances involved in the transaction 
require something more in the way of disclosure. These circumstances 
include the making of statements which when taken alone misrepresent 
the state of facts, as in Kannavos. and where a fiduciary relationship 
is found.lil 
The duty to disclose in fiduciary situations applies not only to 
formal relationships such as principal and agent, executor and bene-
ficiary, or bank and depositor, but also to any situation in which a 
feeling of trust and confidence is present.1i2 
A case embodying this latter proposition is Reed v. A. E. Little CO.1iS 
The plaintiff, an inventor, entered the employment of the defendant 
corporation at the age of 65. The employment contract stated that the 
plaintiff was to receive 10 percent of any money received by the 
corporation from a sale of any of the plaintiff's inventions. The plain-
tiff, inexperienced in business matters, looked to the president of the 
corporation as his friend and business advisor. The corporation, while 
negotiating a sale of the plaintiff's inventions for $5 million, suggested 
to the plaintiff that the original contract of employment be changed 
46 Ibid. 
47 See page 37 supra, text and note 13. 
48 Burns v. Dockray, 156 Mass. IS5. 30 N.E. 551, (1892). 
49 Restatement of Torts Second §551, Comment on clause (e), at 49 (Tent. Draft 
No. 11. 1965). 
110 Restatement of Torts Second 1551, at 44 (Tent~ Draft No. 11, 1965). 
lil Van Houten v. Mone, 162 Mass. 414, 38 N.E. 705 (1894); White Tower Man-
agement Corp. v. Taglino, S62 Mus. 453, 19 N.E.2d 700 (1939). When statements 
which are only partial disclosures are made, it makes no difference whether the 
information revealed is in response to a question or is offered voluntarily. Where 
any information is given a duty exists to furnish all the facts to assure a correct 
understanding. . 
112 Prosser, The Law of Torts §101 (3d ed. 1964). 
118 256 Mass. 442. 152 N.E. 918 (1926). 
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to call for an immediate payment of between $50 and $75 thousand 
to the plaintiff for the rights to the inventions. The plaintiff asked 
the president for advice as to the matter. The president responded 
that he thought that the new contract would be in the plaintiff's best 
interest.1I4 When the plaintiff learned of the sale of his ,inventions for 
$3 million, he sued to rescind the second contract. The Court, in 
overruling a demurrer to the complaint, held that there was a duty to 
disclose when one party puts confidence in the integrity of another and 
the latter accepts the confidence.1I11 
Having analyzed the duties of vendors, one should examine any 
possible duty imposed on the buyer to make an investigation. The 
Court in Kannavos, in enabling the plaintiffs to rescind their pur-
chase agreement, held that the plaintiffs were under no duty to dis~ 
cover the zoning and building regulations pertaining to the properties, 
even though the facts were of public record.1I6 The Court relied on its 
1954 decision in Yorke v. Taylor. IIT Yorke overruled past decisions hold-
ing that a plaintiff could not recover if he could have discovered the 
defect with reasonable investigation. The rationale behind these earlier 
decisions was that "the law will not relieve those who suffer damages by 
reason of their own negligence or folly."118 
The facts in Yorke involved an innocent misrepresentation as to the 
assessed value of real estate.IID This misrepresentation had resulted 
from the defendants' not having received their notice of increased 
assessment from the agent who was in charge of the property. The 
information was available at the public assessor's office. Although the 
plaintiffs had visited the office, they had failed to discover the latest 
valuation. In holding that the plaintiffs would not be barred from 
recovering, the Court said: 
The recipient in a business transaction of a fraudulent misrep-
resentation of fact is justified in relying on its truth, although 
he might have ascertained the falsity of the representation had he 
made an investigation.GO · 
Kannavos is a stronger case for the above proposition. Whereas 
Yorke involved an innocent misrepresentation, in Kannavos, the Court 
found that the defendants' actions were intentionally deceptive and 
fraudulent.61 The more culpable the defendant, the less rationale there 
is in preventing a plaintiff from recovering, regardless of failure to 
investigate. 
The Yorke case states that a person is justified in believing that 
114Id. at 446, 152 N.E. at 919. 
1111 Id. at 449, 152 N.E. at 920, 921. 
116 See page 57 supra, text at note 9. 
117 552 Mass. 568, 124 N.E.2d 912 (1955). 
118 Silver v. Frazier, 85 Mass. 582, 589 (1862). 
liD 552 Mass. at 571, 124 N.E.2d at 914. 
60 Id. at 574, 124 N.E.2d at 916, citing 5 Restatement of Torts §540. 
61 See page 57 supra, text at note 8. 
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which is represented to him as· the truth. Thus Yorke and Kannavos 
together stand for the proposition that a man may believe that every-
thing material is being told to him, that it is true, and that nothing 
is being withheld. This case represents a major change from the era 
of caveat emptor. The courts should now take another step to include 
those cases where nothing at all is said, so that men may be able to 
rely on silence as indicating there are no material facts undisclosed. 
JASON R. FELTON 
§1.20. Charitabl~ tort immunity. During the 1969 SURVEY year 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a letter1 requesting 
amici curiae briefs on the issue of charitable tort immunity. The 
request arose out of the case of Grover, Administrator v. Christian 
Science Benevolent Assn.2 The superior court sustained a demurrer 
by the defendant on the ground that in Massachusetts charitable 
institutions, as defined by Chapter 180 of the General Laws, are exempt 
from tort.liability.8 The plaintiff appealed and hearing was set for 
October 1969. Prior to the date of hearing a settlement was reached. 
The combination of a request for amici briefs by the Court and the 
sudden settlement by the charity, brings to. life the long dormant issue 
of charitable tort immunity in the Commonwealth. ~ 
Although occurring after the close of the 1969 SURVEY year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court has taken further action since the settlement 
of the Grover case. Late in December 1969, the Court handed down 
lWopinion in the charitable tort case of Colpyrv. Carney Hospital/> In 
Colby, the defendant set up the charitable tort immunity as a defense 
before the superior court. The plaintiff demurred to this defense, claim-
ing that such a defense was repugnant to the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights6 and United States Constitution.T The demurrer was over-
ruled and the plaintiff appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the immunity was constitu-
tional: "Nothing has been brought to our attention suggesting that 
the doctrine of charitable immunity is repugnant to ... the Constitu-
tions of the United States and tIle Commonwealth."8 In dicta, however, 
the Court noted their previous .stand and then stated, in no uncertain 
terms, that charitable tort immunity has serVed its purpose and will 
be abrogated: 
§1.20. 1 See 15 Boston B.J. 4 (No.8, 1969). 
2 Law No. N·14, at 232. 
8 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876). 
4 As recently as 1965, in Harrigan v. Cape Cod HOSpital, 349 Mass. 765, 208 
N.E.2d 232, the Court affirmed the position that any change must be by the 
legislature. 
111969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1437, 254 N.E.2d 407. 
6 Articles 1, 10, 11, 12 and 20. 
T Amendments Sand 14. ' , 
8 Colby v. Carney Hospital, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1437, 254 N;E.2d 407. 
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In the past on many occasions we have declined to renounce 
the defense of charitable immunity ... because we were of 
opinion that any renunciation ... should be accomplished 
prospectively ... by legislative action. Now it appears that only 
three or four States still adhere to thedoctrine.9 It seems likely 
that no legislative action in this Commonwealth is probable in 
the near future. Accordingly, we take this occasion to give 
adequate warning that the next time we are squarely confronted 
by a legal question respecting the charitable immunity doctrine 
it is our intention to abolish it. [Emphasis added.po 
What the Court did, in effect, was determine that the immunity no 
longer commends itself to propagation and, to avoid the unfairness of 
leaving charities unprotected for past torts on which the statute of 
limitations has not yet run, has stated its next holding in advance. Of 
course the claim in this c;ase, one of constitutionality, was. properly 
denied. This does mean, however, that should Colby be defeated below 
based on the immunity, he can and will, succeed on appeal. This dicta 
a~ gives Massachusetts charities the opportunity to acquire insurance 
before the immunity doctrine is abrogated. 
What the Court has not stated is the extent and method by which 
it will abolish the immunity. This could be done immediately and 
totally; that is, charities are liable and and will be so held in every 
case hereafter. This could create financial problems for tortious acts 
occurring before the charities acquired insurance. The Court could 
limit the abolition to specific typls of charities.ll It could also make 
the new liability prospective, saying, in effect, charities are liable in 
tbis case and in all cases arising after this date.12 The last approach, a 
prospective ruling, seems the fairest since it will hurt only the vehicle 
charity. All other charities, with the Colby warning, could be insured 
by that date. 
The dicta in Colby was not without forewarning. Beginning with 
Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital13 in 1923, the Court, while affirm-
ing the doctrine, began hinting that a change might be desirable. In 
Foley, the Court noted that while a change might be appropriate, any 
such change would have to come from the legislature. Perhaps the 
strongest statement on change before Colby was in Simpscm v. The 
Truesdale Hospital, Inc.,14 decided in 1958: 
While as an original proposition the doctrine might not com-
mend itself to us today, it has been firmly imbedded in our law 
9 Citing 2 Restatement of Trusts Second §402(2) and Comment on subsection (2), 
and Prosser on Torts (Sd ed.) §127, at 1021-1024. 
10 Colby v. Carney Hospital, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 14S7-14l18, 254 N.E.2d at 408. 
11 For example, just hospitals. See Kojio v. Doctor's Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d S67, 
107 N.W.2d lSI (1961). 
12 See; Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hospital Inc., 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E.2d 485 
(1967). 
13246 Mass. S6S, 141 N.E. llS (1923). 
14 S38 Mass. 787, 154 N.E.2d 357 (1958). 
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for over three quarters of a century and we think that its "termina-
tion should be at legislative, rather than at judicial hands." [Cita-
tion omitted.]111 
The cases since 1958 have affirmed the Simpson dicta on change.16 
While the Court has been indirectly advising that the General Court 
change the charitable tort immunity, the legislature has not overlooked 
the issue. There are perennial bills17 introduced in both houses of the 
legislature to terminate the immunity either totally or with a minor 4 
restriction. They are perennially defeated.18 1f 
The legislature has thus shown that it will not act. Perhaps the 
charities' influence is very strong, but whatever the reason, it became 
glaringly apparent that the only way the charitable tort immunity 
doctrine will be abolished is by the Supreme Judicial Court. The 
Court finally recognized this in Colby. However the Court determines 
to abolish the immunity, it is time that this doctrine, originating in the 
United States in Massachusetts on a misreading of the then current 
English law, S'hould be abolished. The situation will then be more 
equitable and in line with modern law in the rest of the United States 
and other common law countries. 
LOUIS B. BLUMENFELD 
111 Id. at 787-788. 154 N.E.2d at 558. 
16 See Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hospital. 549 Mass. 765. 208 N.E.2d 252 (1965); 
Boxer v. Boston Symphony Orchestra. Inc.. 542 Mass. 557. 174 N.E.2d 565 (1961); 
Barrett v. Brooks Hospital. Inc .• 558 Mass. 754. 157 N.E.2d 658. (1959). 
111968: S. Doc. 559. H.R. Docs. 567. 485. 712. 726. 750. 2567. 5670. 4197; 1966: 
S. Doc. 228. H.R. Doc. 2462; 1961; H.R. Docs. 527. 555. 1578: 1960 S. Doc. 62; 1959: 
H.R. Doc. 1248. 
18 See 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.17; 1965 id. §5.15; 1964 id. §5.12; 1965 id. 
§lI.l5. 
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JAMES W. SMITH 
§2.1. Introduction. For over 100 years the law of Massachusetts 
has been that, where the plaintiff's own negligence contributed as an 
efficient cause of his injury, he is totally barred from recovery even 
though the defendant was also guilty of negligence which contributed 
proximately to the result.1 Chapter 761 of the Acts of 1969 abolishes 
this rule and establishes in Massachusetts the doctrine of comparative 
negligence. 
Chapter 761, which becomes effective on January 1, 1971, and applies 
only to causes of action arising on or after that date, amends Chapter 
231 of the General Laws by striking out Section 85 and inserting in 
place thereof the following: 
§85. Contributory Negligence No Bar to Recovery of Damages; 
Findings of Fact or SPecial Verdict; Reduction of Damages by 
Court. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any 
action by any person or legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or prop-
erty, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the 
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed 
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death 
recovery is made. 
In any such action the court, in a nonjury trial, shall make 
findings of fact or, in a jury trial, the jury shall return a special 
verdict, which shall state: 
(1) the amount of the damages which would have been recover-
able if there had been no contributory negligence; and 
"(2) the degree of negligence of each party, expressed as' a per-
centage. 
Upon such findings of fact or the return of such a special 
verdict by the jury, the court shall reduce the amount of the 
damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable 
to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is made; 
provided, however, that if said proportion is equal to or greater 
than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, 
JAMES W. SHrm is a Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
§2.1. 1 Brown v. Kendall. 60 Mass. 292 (1850). 
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then, in such event, the court shall enter judgment for the defen-
dant. 
The basic operation of the Massa.chusetts comparative negligence 
statute is not particularly complex. In a jury trial, the jury returns 
a special verdict stating the amount of the damages which would have 
been recoverable had there been no contributory negligence, and the 
degree of negligence of each party expressed as a percentage. In a 
nonjury trial these findings are made by the judge. If the percentage 
of negligence attributable to the plaintiff equals or exceeds that 
percentage attributable to the defendant, the court entets judgment 
for the de£endant.2 If the plaintiff's percentage of negligence is less 
than the defendant's percentage, the court reduces the plaintiff's 
damages in proportion' to the amount of negligence attributable to 
him. The proportionate' reduction is based upon the ratio that the 
plaintiff's negligence bell1'5 to the combined negligence of plaintiff and 
defendant (usually 100 percent) and not the ratio that the plaintiff's 
negligence bears to the defendant's.B Thus, if the plaintiff was found 
20 percent negligent and the defendant 80 percent negligent, the 
plaintiff's recovery would be reduced by 20 percent (20/100) and not 
by 25 percent (20/80). 
A. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE STATUTE 
§2.2. Special verdict. The requirement that the jury return a 
special verdict has two purposes. One is . based upon a fear that a jury, 
if allowed to render a' general verdict, may not reduce the plaintiff's 
damages as instructed. While it is tt:Ue that a jury today may ignore 
contributory negligence or compror¢se its verdict, the overall danger 
of a sympathetic jury ignoring the instructions of the trial judge 
2 The operation of this part of the statute leads to the apparently illogical result 
that, if the plaintiff is 45 percent negligent, he recovers 55 percent of his damages; 
whereas, if he is 50 percent negli~nt, he recovers nothing. While this limitation has 
been criticized as "too much shot through with the noxious and stultifying contrib-
utory negligence notion" (see 82 A.T .I..J. 741, 768, 1968), it does seem that there 
oUght to be a point where the plaintiff'i own negligence so substantially contributes 
to his injury that reCovery should be denied, particularly with respect to damages 
for intangibles, i.e., pain and suffering. 
Similar limitations exist in Arkansas (Ark. Stat. Ann. §27-1780 (1962»; Maine 
(Me. Rev. Stat. ,Ann. tit. 14 §156 (Supp. 1965»; and Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. §895-045 
(1968). Mississippi on the other hand has a so-Called "pure" comparative negligence 
statute. (Misi. Code Ann. §1454 (1956». 
New. Hampshire recently enac1led, a mmparative negligence statute which has a 
slight variat,ion on .this percentage test. N.H. Rev_ Stat. Ann. §507:7a (1969). The 
New Hampshire statute allow. ,the plain~iff a partial recovery "if his negligence was 
not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant ••• ," Thus, whereas in 
Massachusetts a finding of '50 percent negligence on the part of the plaintiff would 
bar recovery, in New Hampshire, a finding of 51 percent negligence on the plain-
tiff's part would be necessary to. bar' recovery. The difference is purely academic. 
S See Cameron v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W. 420 (1988), 
rehearing denied, 210 Wis. 668, 247 N.W. 455 (1985). 
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